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Abstract
For the first time in nearly a century, serious conversations are taking place involving reform of the Nation’s highest court. Scholarly wisdom holds that such discussions indicate
a decrease of the Court’s legitimacy which will have detrimental effects on the rule of law
and minority rights. Indeed, several generations of political science scholarship have examined the relationship between institutional support for the Supreme Court and its ability to
exercise judicial power effectively, all finding a strong relationship. Do reform efforts actually signal a collapse in Court legitimacy and the death of the rule of law as we know it?
Will groups have to appeal to popular majorities now that the Court is seemingly without
legitimacy to validate and protect minority rights against the majority?
In this dissertation, I argue that, contrary to conventional wisdom, people can desire
change for the Court while still ascribing it the legitimacy necessary to retain its place in the
constitutional order. As such, efforts to reform the Court are not detrimental to the rule of
law. In the process, I argue that how the field has traditionally conceptualized “legitimacy,”
which is thought of as a willingness to defend the Court (or, institutional diffuse support),
has several shortcomings that make it a less-than-ideal measure of legitimacy. In its place,
I argue that an internalized feeling of obligation is a more appropriate conceptualization of
legitimacy, and that these two measures are only weakly correlated. Once we have a better
understanding of legitimacy, it becomes clear that people can desire alterations to the Court
for a variety of reasons, several of which have nothing to do with its legitimacy.
This project underscores the motivations and consequences of reform efforts and helps
explain how they can coexist with a Supreme Court that has a robust, thriving legitimacy.
For reform advocates, it affects how the issue is framed and debated by highlighting the
distinction between legitimacy and reform. For opponents, the project provides reassurance
that any efforts undertaken do not threaten the legitimacy of the institution or the rule of law
by showing that the Court can maintain its place in the constitutional order amid reform
attempts. Additionally, this project enables discussions of democratic accountability and
representation by investigating the extent to which the public holds the Court accountable
without threatening its place in the constitutional order. Democratic institutions rely on
legitimacy for governance, courts rely on legitimacy for their decisions to be realized, and
activists who turn to courts rely on legitimacy for rights-protection and implementation. By
refining and improving our conceptualization of legitimacy, this dissertation advances our
understanding of a critical concept while further exploring the way that society interacts
with and understands the Supreme Court.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

“But they’ve ruled and we live with their decision. That’s
what it’s all about. We live with the decision of the
Supreme Court. Very powerful. A very powerful decision
actually. But they have so ruled.”
President Donald J. Trump, June 15, 2020
(quoted in Samuels 2020)

On the evening of September 18, 2020, the United States Supreme Court announced the
death of Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the age of 87.1 After having lived a long
and inspirational life, her sudden death from metastatic pancreatic cancer a mere forty-five
days before the November 2020 General Election meant that the ideological balance of the
Supreme Court would be solidified as a 6-3 conservative supermajority for generations if
President Donald Trump filled the seat. For many, this 6th conservative justice—and third
Trump appointee to the High Bench—would be the final nail in the coffins of abortion,
marriage, and voting rights, and have the potential to undo the late Justice Ginsburg’s
lifework advancing equality under law.
Almost immediately upon her death, both Democrats and Republicans started dueling
1

United States Supreme Court Press Release, September 18, 2020.

1

about the fate of the late justice’s seat. Republicans argued that they had a mandate from
the public to fill the seat,2 while Democrats argued that the seat should be filled by the
winner of the upcoming November election as was done when the Republican-controlled
Senate refused a vote on President Obama’s nominee to replace the late Justice Antonin
Scalia before the 2016 election.3
Once it became clear that Republicans would ignore their own precedent set in 2016,
calls for court reform among Democrats began to multiply. Senator Ed Markey tweeted
that, should Republicans fill Justice Ginsburg’s seat before the election, Democrats would
“abolish the filibuster and expand the court” upon retaking the Senate.4 A couple weeks
later, three Democratic representatives introduced a bill in Congress—aptly called “The
Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular Appointments Act”—with the goal of reforming
the Court. Under the plan, each president would get two appointments to the Court: one in
their first year and one in their third, with all appointees limited to a single 18-year term.
After that time, they would circle to a lower court until retirement, though could still return
to the bench upon a sudden vacancy. Importantly, this bill would also increase the size of
the Court temporarily.
These modern efforts to reform the Court are not new. For example, “Fix the Court,”
a progressive organization devoted to this very issue, has promoted various reforms since its
founding in 2014, and calls for reform have increased following President Trump’s packing of
lower courts with ideological bedfellows (Millhiser, 2019; Levy, 2019; Keck, 2018). However,
calls increased following Republicans’ refusal to hold a vote on Justice Scalia’s successor
before the 2016 election, and have magnified precipitously following the death of Justice
Ginsburg. For the first time in nearly a century, the idea of packing the U.S. Supreme
Court is increasingly mainstream. The platform for a major political party going into the
2

Press Release from Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell on the Passing of Justice Ginsburg (Link)
Vice President Joe Biden Speech on the Passing of Justice Ginsburg (Link)
4
Link to Tweet: @EdMarkey — 4:54PM on September 19, 2020.
3

2

2020 General Election said that they, “...recognize[] the need for structural court reforms
to increase transparency and accountability” (DNC, 2020, 58), and Democratic Candidate
Joe Biden’s refusal to signal support or opposition to the idea of expanding the size of the
Supreme Court was a common line of attack for Republicans leading up to the election.
Once in office, President Biden created a commission with the task of studying the merits
and demerits of various reforms for the Court.
Importantly, efforts to alter the Court are not solely Democratic or progressive. Steven
Calabresis, the founder of the conservative Federalist Society, has advocated for term limits
for the justices on the Court (Calabresi and Lindgren, 2006), and Senators Ted Cruz and
John McCain held open the possibility of permanently refusing a vote on any Hillary Clinton
nominee should she win the 2016 election (ostensibly shrinking the Court to eight justices)
(Totenberg, 2016). Republicans have also shown a willingness to reform lower courts, such
as when they attempted to shrink the size of the D.C. Circuit Court in an effort to prevent
President Obama from filling three vacancies (Shesol, 2013).
Further, reform efforts are not solely an elite endeavor. As discussed in more detail in the
subsequent chapters, a sizable portion of the public has expressed a willingness to support
reform of the Court at various points throughout polling history. Although the level of
support varies by the reform being polled, the idea that the public holds the Supreme Court
in high regard and zealously defends it from alterations seems unsupported in public opinion
data. To put it another way, we have reached a point where the idea of altering the Court is
increasingly mainstream and much less outlandish than it was even as recently as a decade
ago. Elites of both parties, and the mass public, all support reform to some extent, whether
term limits, alterations in size, or mandatory retirement ages.
Setting aside normative considerations that may or may not justify reform5 , generations
5
Normative discussions surrounding legitimacy and court reform are beyond the scope of the present
project.

3

of research on the legitimacy of the high court suggests that efforts to fundamentally alter the
institution are grounds for worry. This alarm derives from decades of research arguing that
legitimacy exists up until an individual is willing “to accept, make, or countenance major
changes in the fundamental attributes of how the High Bench functions or fits into the U.S.
constitutional system” (Caldeira and Gibson, 1992, 638). It seems uncontroversial to say that
the entire field of judicial legitimacy is premised on this assumption that an individual will
defend an institution they view as being legitimate from being changed. (Gibson, Caldeira
and Baird, 1998; Gibson, Caldeira and Spence, 2003; Gibson, 2011; Badas, 2019).
As a result, the current political environment where several groups tolerate or actively
promote reform signals that the Court’s legitimacy has plummeted. An institution once
regarded as the most legitimate among the three branches is now, it would seem, nothing
more than a paper tiger, relegated to the whims of the other two branches of government in
that it is unable to compel the realization of its judgements independently.
A court that loses its legitimacy would become a court in name only and be unable
to fulfil its institutional or normative duties, resulting in a deterioration in the rule of law
and minority rights. Since the Court famously lacks a sword or purse by design,6 it relies
entirely on goodwill—from elected officials and the public at large—for the efficacy of its
rulings (Clark, 2011). Gibson and Nelson (2014, 202) put it best when they said that, “The
particular problem for the US Supreme Court is that it is heavily dependent upon legitimacy
for its efficacy and survival.” Legitimacy is what enables the Court to declare legislation
enacted by the people’s representatives invalid, permitting it to overcome what Bickel (1986)
identifies as the “countermajoritarian difficulty” of an unelected judiciary invalidating legislation enacted through the democratically-elected process. A Court without legitimacy runs
the risk of becoming socially, politically, and institutionally insignificant. A Court without
legitimacy would also find it challenging to protect the rights of vulnerable minority groups.
6
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As Zilis (2018, 272) notes, if the Court’s legitimacy deteriorates each time it protects an unpopular minority group, for example, “this may affect the institution’s willingness to protect
minority rights in the future” (Zilis, 2021).7
Given the Court’s dependence on public goodwill for the efficacy of its decisions and
maintaining its place as a co-equal branch of government, it is unsurprising that several
decades of scholarship is concerned with understanding the etiology, contours, and limitations
of that public goodwill. As noted by Nelson and Gibson (2018, 132), no topic within the field
of law and courts has received as much scholarly attention except perhaps that of judicial
decision making. Although this research has a long tradition, it has only recently seen a
resurgence, with questions long considered settled receiving renewed scrutiny. This research
points in one direction: reform attempts signal a sharp decrease in legitimacy which will
have detrimental effects on the rule of law.
This project both builds on existing research and challenges some of its foundational
assumptions. First, this dissertation takes as the point of departure the assertion in existing research that people will defend a legitimate institution from changes. The positive
association between legitimacy and protecting the Court is foundational to the utility of
using institutional support as an indicator for legitimacy. If, in contrast, legitimacy and
institutional support were to be negative correlated, for example, the latter becomes a lessthan-ideal measure of legitimacy.
Instead of institutional support, this dissertation returns to the theoretical underpinnings
of legitimacy theory to advance a new indicator of legitimacy; namely, internalized felt
obligation toward the institution. Shifting our measure means that legitimacy exists up
7
One potential objection to the argument that a court depends on legitimacy for its survival is that it
could still exercise a countermajoritarian function in ways that benefit certain important elites. In other
words, the Court has other institutional tools beyond its legitimacy to function. However, at some point, such
action on behalf of the Court ceases to be “countermajoritarian” in the Bicklean sense. More fundamentally,
however, it is legitimacy which would allow the Court to focus on a select important constituency without
significant institutional repercussions. In other words, appealing to a select group of well-positioned elites is
likely to provoke backlash if not for a widespread sense of legitimacy in the Court.

5

until an individual begins to view a court’s pronouncements as optional, not when they
begin to tolerate or promote changes to the status quo. Moreover, thinking of legitimacy in
terms of the widespread obligation felt in the institution allows for legitimacy to motivate
reform attempts. In other words, people can desire to reform the institution precisely because
they recognize that its legitimacy acts much like a sword to achieve policy objectives.
High levels of obligation felt toward the Court is what allows it to not just function
effectively, but to exercise any of its normative or institutional duties. Among the mass
public, these attitudes represent the legitimizing of the Court, conferring on the Court and
society a mandate that its decisions are to be respected, followed, and implemented, even if
they are decided incorrectly. They also allow the public to warn and hold accountable public
officials who seek to ignore the Court and go astray. For public officials, these attitudes
represent the extent to which they are willing to go along with the Court before openly
thwarting or questioning its authority. Institutionally, it is these attitudes that give the
Court its teeth: without which, the Supreme Court has no power and is politically, legally,
and socially insignificant. The Court loses its ability to decide cases efficaciously, resolve
conflicts, or structure society, effectively being a court in name only (Shapiro, 1981). The
“countermajoritarian” institution loses its ability to be countermajoritarian, and the rights of
minorities can only be realized through conventional majoritarian venues leaving minorities
to appeal to the better angels of majorities (Zilis, 2021).
The next section will better define legitimacy and specifically illustrate how scholars
traditionally have measured the concept. Attention then turns to highlighting several flaws
in the existing account, and introducing the idea of felt obligation as a superior measure of
legitimacy. The subsequent section explains what this reconceptualization means for existing
research. The final section in this chapter outlines the plan of the dissertation.
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1.1

What is “Legitimacy,” Anyway?

Conceptually, few dispute that legitimacy is psychological in nature, consisting of an ascription on behalf of an individual to some authority. In a widely-accepted definition, Tyler
(2006a, 375) argues that, “Legitimacy is a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate,
proper, and just. Because of legitimacy, people feel that they ought to defer to decisions and
rules, following them voluntarily out of obligation rather than out of fear of punishment or
anticipation of reward” (also quoted in Gibson and Nelson (2018, 6) and Nelson and Gibson
(2018, 133)).
This conceptualization of legitimacy is consistent with work in other domains, such as
organizational and political theory. French and Raven (1959, 323), for example, argue that,
“legitimate power of O/P is here defined as that power which stems from internalized values
in P which dictate that O has a legitimate right to influence P and that P has an obligation
to accept this influence,” and Tyler (1997, 323) notes that, “Political theorists have similarly
defined legitimacy as the belief within the members of society that there are adequate reasons
to voluntarily obey the commands of authorities.” Decades (indeed, centuries) of research
and theorizing point to the same conclusion: legitimacy exists in the eyes of the beholder
and involves an internalized feeling of obligation and compulsion to some external actor,
institution, or norm.
Legitimacy is critical for governing institutions because, without it, these institutions
find their authority contested (Gibson and Nelson, 2018, 7). Legitimacy permits institutions
to effectively govern and structure society without having to resort to the use—or threat—of
enforcement action costly to the government. A governing institution without legitimacy
requires a complex surveillance apparatus to identify those who challenge its authority, an
impressive system of correcting the behavior (through policing, for example), all while hoping
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that such corrective action did not further deteriorate the institution’s legitimacy in the eyes
of the public (Tyler, 2006b).
Consequently, governments attempt to inculcate legitimacy values and feelings of obligation early in life through a process of legal socialization in an attempt to curtail the need for
costly oversight and enforcement (Tyler and Trinkner, 2017; Trinkner and Tyler, 2016). Because of its function and purpose, then, legitimacy has been referred to as the “...endorphin
of the democratic body politic...” in that it “...reduc[es] the friction that inevitably arises
when people are not able to get everything they want from politics” (Gibson, 2004).

1.2

Legitimacy within the Supreme Court Context

When it comes to evaluations of institutions, Easton (1965) posits the existence of two types
of support: specific and diffuse (Easton, 1975). Specific support refers to immediate and
concrete satisfaction with how the institution is doing. Within the context of the Supreme
Court, this can include satisfaction with policy outputs, but has also been conceptualized
to... “...reflect other considerations, including satisfaction with how decisions are made, the
speed and alacrity with which they are made, how litigants are treated, how the opinion is
written, and the overall context of the institution” (Gibson and Nelson, 2015, 164). Gibson
and Nelson go on to say, “Perhaps, for some, dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court has
nothing at all to do with the ideological makeup of its decisions, but is based instead on the
fact that it makes so few decisions per term. Dissatisfaction may also stem from the actions
of the justices, such as writing books for profit, going duck hunting, disagreeing in public
with the president, or refusing to televise its proceedings” (164). Thus, for some scholars,
specific support is quite encompassing.
Researchers interested in the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court have found home
within this Eastonian tradition and continue to understand legitimacy as diffuse support,
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which Easton defines as “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members
to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as
damaging to their wants” (Easton, 1965, 273). For the Court, this version of support refers
to a “reservoir of goodwill” upon which the institution can draw when making controversial
decisions. It is this type of support that is widely implicated in discussions of “legitimacy”
within the field of law and courts, both in the United States and elsewhere. Here, support is
not completely independent of performance satisfaction—–in fact, Easton (1975) acknowledges that an institution producing multiple unfavorable outputs might eventually lose even
diffuse support.
The connection between specific and diffuse support is of great interest to scholars, as
this relationship is what permits the Court to overcome the “countermajoritarian difficulty”
(Bickel, 1986) and and maintain its independence. Were legitimacy contingent upon immediate satisfaction with outputs, courts in democratic systems would need to appeal to
majorities in an effort to retain their authority. Such courts would be unable to defend the
rights of vulnerable minorities or prevent majorities from trampling on fundamental rights,
resulting in a quick deterioration in the rule of law. Courts would simply be ignored when
they had the audacity to act in a countermajoritarian manner. This is a hotly debated
area in the literature, with Gibson and Nelson (2014, 208) arguing that, “although specific
support may have some direct relationship with diffuse support, that relationship is, at best,
a small one.”
To operationalize diffuse support with regards to the U.S. Supreme Court, past scholarship has drawn inspiration from historic efforts to curb the Court, especially President
Roosevelt’s “Court Packing Plan of 1937.” Gibson, Caldeira and Spence (2003, 363) operationalize legitimacy as institutional commitment, defined as an “unwillingness to make or
accept fundamental changes in the functions of the institution,” which echoes some of their
earlier work (Caldeira and Gibson, 1992; Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998).
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The logic of operationalizing legitimacy as institutional commitment8 is that, to the
extent that people view an institution as legitimate, they should be willing to defend it from
serious, meaningful alterations even if they disagree with its immediate outputs. Gibson
and Caldeira (2009a, 45) argue that, “[t]o the extent people support fundamental structural
changes in an institution, are willing to punish the institution for its policy outputs, and
generally distrust it, they are extending little legitimacy to that institution.”
Importantly, researchers have evolved from using institutional support as an indicator of
legitimacy to equating it to legitimacy. In recent scholarship, legitimacy exists up until an
individual is willing to promote or tolerate changes in the institution, and a repudiation of
reform attempts is viewed as a sign of legitimacy (Bartels and Johnston, 2020, 52).
Understanding legitimacy as institutional loyalty—and assuming people will defend an
institution they view as being legitimate from being changed—has become the dominant
view of studies of judicial legitimacy, both in the United States and elsewhere

1.3

Shortcomings with Measuring Legitimacy as Institutional Support

While the field has been advanced significantly over the decades by conceptualizing legitimacy as institutional support, there are a few shortcomings with this approach that make it
a less-than-ideal measure for legitimacy. This section seeks to highlight some shortcomings
with the current ubiquitous approach, beginning first with the relationship between diffuse
support and legitimacy outlined in Easton’s seminal work that serves as the foundation of the
literature. Next, the section highlights a few other shortcomings with the current approach
in preparation for offering up an alternative in the subsequent section.
8

Also called diffuse or institutional support.
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1.3.1

Reconsidering Easton’s Relationship to Legitimacy

As recounted, The Eastonian tradition argues for the existence of two types of support—
diffuse and specific—with Supreme Court researchers equating the former with legitimacy.
However, Easton himself did not view them as synonymous, and even argued that they
might be unrelated. This often overlooked insight has important implications for whether
institutional support is an ideal measure of legitimacy.
Joining other scholars, Easton emphasizes the importance of legitimacy to the stability
and efficacy of many different types of regimes. Specifically Easton (1965, 279) notes that,

If a system is to convert inputs into outputs, it must provide means for committing the resources of the system to the attainment of the goals and to rallying
the energies of the members for the associated tasks. In most systems, as the
occasion demands it, the authorities rely to some extent on persuasion, appeals
to self-interest or tradition, or on force to obtain acceptance of or acquiescence in
their outputs and the structures through which they are produced. But in most
systems, the effectiveness of outputs cannot be left either exclusively or largely
to chance, the accident of coincidence of interest between system goals and individual goals, or the diseconomies and indeterminacy of force. Especially in the
case of large-scale systems, it is important to stabilize the relationship between
those who are responsible for the day-to-day activities in the name of the system,
that is, the authorities, and the general membership. If the constant threat of
living on a precipice of disorder is to be avoided, at the minimum the authorities
require some assurance that within the limits set forth in the political system,
limits that I have been calling the regime, they can expect regularly to obtain
compliance with respect to the adoption and implementation of outputs and the
performance of necessary tasks. The belief in the legitimacy of authorities and
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regime provides such a stable connection.

Like those before him, Easton underscores the importance of legitimacy for regimes to
exist, and focuses in on peoples’ internalized feelings of obligation toward the regime. Specifically, he goes on to note that, “Regardless of what the members may feel about the wisdom
of the actions of authorities, obedience may flow from some rudimentary convictions about
the appropriateness of the political order of things. One simply ought to obey the authorities
and abide by the basic political rules; no alternative is conceivable since it is the right thing
to do. They are legitimate” (Easton, 1965, 279-280).9 This is similar to the understanding of
legitimacy offered earlier and incorporates psychological perspectives on legitimacy (Tyler,
2006a) and those found throughout organizational theory (French and Raven, 1959).
Critically, for Easton, legitimacy and diffuse support might be correlated with the former
potentially facilitating the latter, but they are not required to be. Easton (1965, 282) notes
that, “...although legitimacy is a major source of diffuse support in most systems we know
about, it is certainly not the case in all.” As a result, it is critical to remember that institutional diffuse support and legitimacy are two distinct concepts, even within the Eastonian
framework, and the literature has evolved to equate the two over time. Recognizing these
two concepts as distinct provides the opportunity to evaluate whether diffuse support is the
ideal indicator of legitimacy.

1.3.2

Public Support for Reform Across Time

Empirically, there is a stark disconnect between scholarship—which finds robust legitimacy
for the Court when measuring institutional support—and public support for various types
of court reform. At the same time scholars posit that the Court’s legitimacy is high because
the public is willing to defend it from meaningful alterations, a not-insignificant portion of
9

Emphasis added
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the public supports some types of Court reform.
Table 1.2 summarizes support among the public for a variety of possible reforms to the
Supreme Court over the years, taken from a (non-exhaustive) search of the Roper Center for
Public Opinion Polling at Cornell University supplemented with additional data discovered
outside of the Roper Center archive. Entries in bold indicate plurality support for the
polled reform. The results show a similar pattern: through the decades, a significant portion
of the public has favored reform to the Court at one point or another, with the support
shown depending heavily on the type of reform. Questions asking about term limits or
mandatory retirement ages receive the greatest support, for example, while questions asking
about adding justices or creating an oversight board with the authority to reverse the Court
receive the least support.
According to the data, a large portion of the public seems willing to accept some reforms
to both the structure and function of the Court for some time now. This public support for
reform has gone unaddressed by existing scholarship which argues that the Court’s legitimacy is high despite large swaths of the public being willing to tolerate pretty substantial
alterations to the institution, all of which would have significant implications for its functioning. If the proper conceptualization of legitimacy is a willingness to defend the Court from
meaningful alterations (institutional support), that a large portion of the public supports
various alterations seems to be a problem for the Court’s legitimacy and, subsequently, the
rule of law.
Bartels and Johnston (2020) come to a similar conclusion, though from a different route.
Using data from court curbing bills introduced in Congress, Bartels and Johnston argue that
we would not expect single-minded seekers of re-elction (Mayhew, 2004) to attempt reform
of the Court so long as the public was willing to defend the Court (as conventional legitimacy
research argues). Empirically, they find over 700 “court curbing” bills have been introduced
since Reconstruction and take this as evidence that Members of Congress are picking up an
13
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Reform
Increase Num. of Justices
Fixed Terms
Limit Judicial Review
Increase Num. of Justices
Fixed Terms
Limit Judicial Review
15-Year Term Limits
Increase Num. of Justices
Increase Num. of Justices
Increase Num. of Justices
Term Limits (Vague)
Vote Justices Off Court
Term Limits (Wording A)
Term Limits (Wording B)
Televised Hearings*
Fixed 18 Year Terms
Mandatory Retirement Age
Mandatory Retirement Age
Term Limits*
Direct Election of Justices
Justices Serve for Set Years
Term Limits
Mandatory Retirement at 72
Oversight Court with Overturn Authority
Mandatory Retirement
Constitutional Amend. Fixing Number of Justices at Nine
Forced Retirement Between 70 and 75
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan (Liberal Priming)
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan

% Support
46
75
41
43
72
38
54
20
37
24
72
62
74
71
45
56
66
60
70
54
80
68
76
19
70
61
64
41
44
49
44
48
46
47
42
47

% Oppose
53
25
58
57
28
62
32
55
51
49
25
34
22
27
31
35
28
39
21
41
16
28
17
53
30
39
36
44
46
51
43
42
45
53
46
53

Source
Marquette University Law School
Marquette University Law School
Marquette University Law School
Marquette University Law School
Marquette University Law School
Marquette University Law School
Voters Study Group
Voters Study Group
Fox News
Winston Group
Fox News
Fox News
Democracy Corps
Democracy Corps
Fairleigh Dickson University
Fairleigh Dickson University
Opinion Dynamics
Associated Press
Los Angeles Times
Los Angeles Times
CBS News and New York Times
Hearst Corporation
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
Gallup Organization
(Gallup Organization, 1937d)

Table 1.2: Public opinion data showing support for various court reform efforts throughout the years.
Source: Roper Center iPoll and the Voters Study Group

Year
2020
2020
2020
2019
2019
2019
2019
2019
2019
2019
2015
2015
2014
2014
2010
2010
2005
2004
1991
1991
1987
1986
1965
1963
1938
1938
1937
1937
1937
1937
1937
1937
1937
1937
1937
1937

incentive from their constituents to attempt to change the Court.

1.3.3

Institutional Support’s Relationship to Court Efficacy

An additional limitation with the existing conceptualization of legitimacy is that it is only
tangentially related to why scholars are interested in legitimacy in the first place, namely,
the ability of the institution to exist as a co-equal branch of government and fulfil its duties
effectively. Gibson and Caldeira (2009b, 40) argue that “...the most politically significant attitudes are best thought of as a form of institutional loyalty,” operationalized as a willingness
to defend the institution from changes.
Although defending an institution from changes is undoubtedly an important political
attitude, it is only indirectly related to the ability of the court to function as an institution.
In other words, it is conceivable that people can be unwilling to defend the institution from
changes while not impacting its ability to function as a Court or harming its standing as a
co-equal branch of government. Scholars interested in legitimacy broadly, and of legitimacy
of the Court particularly, are interested in the concept given its consequences should legitimacy decrease. Conceptualizing and measuring legitimacy as institutional support does not
capture an important dimension of legitimacy that would allow the Court to function even
in the face of decreased institutional support.
In contrast, understanding legitimacy as obligation felt toward the institution forefronts
a significant source of the Court’s power: namely, that a large portion of the public views
their determinations worthy of being obeyed, not just by the parties directly before the
Court but, instead, by the body politic more generally. Such widespread perceptions raise
the social and political costs for noncompliance which speaks directly to the ability of the
Court to fulfil its duties.

15

1.3.4

Determining Other Causes of Institutional Support

Equating legitimacy and institutional support makes it impossible to determine other factors
influencing institutional support that have nothing to do with legitimacy; for example, believing you or your social group currently benefits from the institutional status quo (Bartels
and Johnston, 2020). In this case, defending the Court from alterations has nothing to do
with legitimacy but, instead, has everything to do with a cost-benefit analysis and a belief
that the institution currently benefits you or members of your social group. If, for example,
you expect the Court to produce policies in the future consistent with your visions, you are
unlikely to support reforms (Braman, 2022). However, if you worry about what the Court
might do in the future, you might support efforts at reform while, nevertheless, believing the
Court is legitimate. Indeed, to foreshadow results presented in later chapters, this possibility
becomes clear once we alter our understanding of legitimacy.

1.4

Felt Obligation: Legitimacy as a Sword

This dissertation offers an alternative while attempting to address the questions identified
earlier. While literature on the U.S. Supreme Court focuses on institutional support, scholars
in other areas of law and society underscore the psychological motivations that relate to
compliance (not institutional support), especially as they relate to policing and the law
more generally (Tyler, 2001, 2006a,b; Tyler and Jackson, 2014; Tyler and Trinkner, 2017).
To put it another way, rather than focus on whether people are willing to defend an
institution from alterations (as the traditional institutional support measure argues), these
studies focus on whether an individual has internalized a feeling of obligation towards an
authority. In doing so, they offer inspiration for how the judicial legitimacy scholarship can
move beyond the current discussions of institutional support (Nelson and Gibson, 2020). In
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the process, the new conceptualization promotes collaboration across subfields and literatures while addressing several of the other concerns previously identified. Because even the
Eastonian tradition emphasizes an internalized feeling of obligation for the importance of
legitimacy, this could be a useful avenue to explore for measuring legitimacy.
Although most of these studies focus on the specific act of compliance (for example, did
an individual stop at the stop sign, abide by their probation restrictions, or obey police
commands), the underlying psychological motivation is transferable to the context of the
U.S. Supreme Court. While it is true that very few individuals are in a position to directly
comply with a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court10 , an internalized feeling of obligation
to the institution nevertheless exists and shape public attitudes toward the Court, elected
officials, and fellow citizens. Felt obligation relates to the social pressure felt to do as the
institution demands, which is an important source of power for the Court.

1.4.1

Benefits of Felt Obligation

In contrast to existing research, I argue that, for courts, the most politically significant
attitudes relate to the ability to command obedience. A court without this power becomes
a court in name only and runs the risk of becoming politically, socially, and institutionally
insignificant. In other words, what matters is less loyalty to the makeup of the institution
and more loyalty to the demands of the institution. Indeed, the Court’s power lies in the
fact that the public views their determinations worthy of being obeyed.
Without a deep-seated sense of obligation felt toward the Court through society, elected
officials are free to disregard inconvenient judicial outputs, as was the case when county
clerk Kim Davis refused to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple in spite of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. Additionally, people would be free to
10

It is worth noting that the public is never in a position to “abolish” the Court or limit its jurisdiction,
both of which comprise the existing ubiquitous institutional support conceptualization.
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disregard the institution without facing social costs, and powerless minorities must appeal
to majorities for vindication of rights since court decisions can easily be ignored. In such a
situation, the Court truly becomes a “hollow hope” (Rosenberg, 2008).
It is an internalized feeling of obligation by the public that enforces the Court’s decisions
on the relevant elected officials, demanding they follow a particular ruling. These attitudes
promote acquiescence to the Court’s judgements by those who are before the Court and those
unrelated to the immediate proceedings, raise social and political costs for noncompliance
among all members of the public, encourage social groups to turn to the courts for recognition
and vindication of basic rights and liberties, constrain the institution itself, and promote
hijacking or entrenchment into the institution for political gain (Hart, 1961; Vanberg, 2001).
Because much of the public feels obligated to obey the Court, it makes the institution a
useful venue through which to try to advance policy goals. If this were not the case, policy
“losers” could simply ignore the Court’s pronouncements with impunity. For this reason,
the Court’s reverence helps to explain partisan entrenchment: if you control the Court, you
control the policy that the Court makes, and legitimacy is what gives judicially-created
policy its teeth.
Very little, if any, obligation felt toward the Court is captured when conceptualizing legitimacy as institutional support. Because the widely agreed upon definition of legitimacy
relates to a psychological property where an institution is deemed worthy of obedience, an
ideal measure of legitimacy is not a willingness to defend the Court from meaningful alterations, but instead, one which captures the extent to which people feel obligated toward
the institution. This feeling obligated to a court is not the same thing as supporting the
institution and, in fact, may be uncorrelated or negatively correlated. That is, it is possible
that as an internalized feeling of obligation increases, a willingness to support the institution decreases. Findings presented below suggest that, when understood as felt obligation,
legitimacy is compatible with support for Court reform and, in fact, might require it.
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1.4.2

How Felt Obligation Differs from Institutional Support

What does framing our understanding of legitimacy around felt obligation and not institutional support entail? This section highlights a few ways that the two understandings differ
with the goal of informing future debates and discussions in the field.
One way in which this new conceptualization does not differ is that is it leaves untouched
the finding that attitudes formed in response to immediate outputs (whether called performance satisfaction or “specific support”) are distinct from legitimacy. To put this another
way, specific outputs are still different than legitimacy.11 Instead, the new framework challenges the other side of the coin: rather than “diffuse” or “institutional support,” this project
argues that felt obligation is a more appropriate indicator of legitimacy. The Court’s legitimacy derives not from its institutional makeup or jurisdiction but, instead, from the fact
that when the Court yells “jump!” much of the public says, “how high?”, even if they are
still willing to increase the number of justices who yell.
This insight has important implications for research in this domain, partly because it lowers the stakes regarding the connectedness between institutional support and policy outputs.
Even if there were a perfect one-to-one relationship between a judicial output and a decrease
in institutional support, the Court’s place in the constitutional order could remain intact.12
Such a situation would have significant other normative implications related to democratic
responsiveness and accountability, but it would not necessarily result in the demise of the
rule of law and pummeling of minority rights as is often feared.
Even so, a conceptualization of legitimacy as felt obligation differs from diffuse support
11

Importantly, the relationship between specific support and felt obligation is an empirical question. It
should not be assumed, though, that the conventional wisdom on the relationship between specific and diffuse
support applies to felt obligation.
12
There is still a discussion to be had about how a Court which loses institutional support can ensure
stability in the law. For example, if there were a one-to-one relationship between outputs and institutional
support such that the institution gets altered every few years to revers unfavorable decisions, that would
make continuity in the law impossible and have serious normative implications. However, such discussions
are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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in a variety of important ways and, as a result, shapes the path of research going forward.
Conceptualizing legitimacy as a feeling of obligation moves the focus away from external
evaluations of an institution itself and towards the individual’s internal psychological motivations. Instead of asking questions about whether the Court should “be done away with” or
if it “gets too mixed up in politics,” and “favors some groups more than others,” as with the
current attempts to gauge legitimacy, this re-conceptualization focuses on whether people
should “comply with decisions by the Court” and “pressure politicians to comply.” In this
regard, re-conceptualization of legitimacy as an “internalized feeling of obligation” differs
from “institutional loyalty” to the extent that the latter refers primarily to a willingness to
defend the institution. Importantly, rather than measuring peoples’ support for the institutional makeup of the Court, measures of obligation can tell researchers a lot about how the
public understands the demands of the institution, how they feel towards those demands,
and how they evaluate elected officials and fellow citizens who disregard those demands.
As noted earlier, another important way these approaches differ is their manifestation.
Conceptualizing legitimacy as felt obligation means that people can—and do—desire to alter
the structure or function of the institution while not threatening the Court’s legitimacy.
Legitimacy exists in the new framework up until people begin to lose their internalized
feeling of obligation toward the Court and start viewing its decisions as optional, not when
they desire to alter the structure or function of the Court. In fact, the reason some exhibit
concern with the makeup Supreme Court or its jurisdiction is precisely because they recognize
the legitimacy that it holds and are concerned with how the Court will wield it.
As shown in subsequent chapters, much of the current support for reform is motivated by
a worry of how the Court will decide future cases involving issues such as same-sex marriage
and abortion. This concern is partly the result of a recognition that the Court’s legitimacy is
high enough that one’s preferred policy objectives can be thwarted. The opinions of a court
with less legitimacy can be treated as suggestive; however, the Supreme Court has enough
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legitimacy that a decision invalidating the Voting Rights Act (for example) cannot be ignored.
For some, this motivates a desire to alter the Court in an effort to steer the Court’s legitimacy
away from less desirable outcomes to more favorable outcomes. It is partly in this way
that conceptualizing legitimacy as felt obligation can open judicial legitimacy scholarship to
other areas within the subfield, such as legal mobilization. Relatedly, studies demonstrating
a strong connection between “specific” and “diffuse” support do not necessarily indicate a
“crisis of legitimacy” for the Court. This insight has important implications for normative
democratic theory, as the public can seek to hold the Supreme Court accountable for its
decisions (by supporting or revoking support for institutional reform) without threatening the
legitimacy of the institution itself and its ability to perform its normative and constitutional
duties.
Another way in which the new conceptualization of legitimacy differs from institutional
support is the degree to which policy dissatisfaction and institutional support are related
is likely to be influenced by an individual’s internalized feeling of obligation: that is, the
extent to which negative decisions influence support for reform is likely moderated by the
obligation felt toward the Court. Related, institutional support can be affected by things
unrelated to legitimacy, such as a belief that the institution is broken or hostile to group
interests. Both of these possibilities are explored further in subsequent chapters.
Finally, reconceptualizing legitimacy as felt obligation will also bring the judicial legitimacy scholarship in line with how the justices themselves understand the nature of their
own legitimacy. While researchers have concerned themselves with a focus on a willingness
to defend the Court from meaningful alterations in the Court’s structure or function, the
justices themselves appear to have a very different understanding of legitimacy that more
closely aligns with felt obligation than institutional loyalty. During a talk with NPR, Justice
Ginsburg noted that “...when the courts say something, people accept it” (emphasis added)
(Totenberg, 2019). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court stated that, “[T]he Court’s
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legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their
principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the nation,” (emphasis added).
The justices, thus, appear to conceptualize legitimacy not as a dependent upon the
makeup of the Court or the range of its jurisdiction but, instead, on the willingness of the
public to accept the Court’s decisions as authoritative and to follow what is demanded. Indeed, the Court goes to great pain to justify their decisions in terms of legal jargon in the
hopes that this will lessen the optics of partisanship on the Court and preserve its legitimacy.
Glennon and Strother (2019) argue that, “Supreme Court justices are cognizant of the legitimacy issue that the Court faces and actively work to reinforce the Court’s advantaged
position when they most directly interface with the public....” While justices probably care
about institutional support, their primary focus from an institutional perspective seems to
be on demand compliance: for without the latter, the former is irrelevant. Thus, another
way that felt obligation is different than institutional support is that it is more closely related
to what the justices, themselves, appear to mean when they talk about “legitimacy.”

1.4.3

Legitimacy and Judicial Power

Central to this literature on judicial power is the extent to which courts can affect social
change: that is, are courts capable of structuring society and resolving conflicts on their
own, or must they rely on the political branches. Perhaps the most widely-known research
in this domain is that found in Rosenberg (2008) who argues that, except for when several
challenging conditions are met, the U.S. Supreme Court is incapable of bringing about social
change. For Rosenberg, history and data show that the Supreme Court only responds once
the political branches signal their willingness to enforce decisions and, when the Court does
wander astray and attempt to enact social policy on its own, its efforts are often in vain
until the political branches get in line (as with school integration following Brown v. Board
of Education in the American south).
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This controversial and provocative thesis has not gone unchallenged. Hall (2011), for
example, argues that the Supreme Court can—and does—enact social change, often relying
on Rosenberg’s own data to support his thesis. Hall finds that the Supreme Court can exert
significant power when it relies solely on lower courts for enforcement, a situation that he
calls “vertical” enforcement. For example, when invalidating the “Gun Free School Zone
Act” passed by Congress, a highly unpopular decision, the Court only needed to rely on
lower Courts for enforcement (i.e., “do not put people in jail for breaking this law.”) The
Court’s power is significantly constrained, though, when it relies on other, non-judicial actors
to enforce its rulings. For example, prohibiting school-led prayer, another unpopular decision
at the time, is much more difficult for the Court to enforce. For Hall, in these situations of
horizontal (as opposed to vertical) enforcement, public opinion helps determine the strength
of the Court’s power: if the public supports the decision, the pressure on elected officials
should enhance the Court’s power. Conversely, an unpopular decision by the Court among
the public would seem to give elected officials a pass, thus curbing the Court’s power and
efficacy. Although Hall is primarily focused on public support of the specific judicial decision,
the insights provided can offer clues to the relationship between how the public feels toward
the institution and the institution’s efficacy.
As this conversation makes clear, legitimacy plays an important role in the discussion
of judicial power. Even so, there are important differences that distinguish the two. First,
judicial power is not itself indicative of legitimacy. In fact, the Court can be very effective
for reasons unrelated to legitimacy, such as instrumental compliance or vertical enforcement,
just to name two (Hall, 2011; Tyler, 2006b). To make judicial efficacy a sole indicator of
legitimacy would to make it impossible to investigate the determinants of power that have
nothing to do with legitimacy, as discussed earlier.
That said, legitimacy should still support judicial power, even in instances where the
Court’s decisions are viewed unfavorably. In other words, even when people disagree with
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a decision (which Hall argues should curb horizontal judicial power), legitimacy should still
promote acquiescence. When individuals with high legitimacy view a decision as unfavorable,
their response should be to work within the existing legitimacy framework to get the decision
changed, not to completely dismiss the decision itself.
Perhaps the best example of working within existing framework to change a disagreeable
policy output is the effort undertaken by several Republican-led states to criminalize abortion
in following Roe v. Wade. Although examples exist of people disregarding the opinion
entirely, more than 20 states have so-called “trigger laws” that will immediately go into
effect should the Supreme Court reverse its previous decision in Roe (McCammon, 2021).
Instead of simply shrugging off the decision13 , opponents of the law are leveraging a sustained,
decades-long effort to get the Court to reverse its earlier decision rather than ignoring the
decision outright.
Finally, the literature on judicial power looks at instrumental indicators of legitimacy,
such as: Did access to abortion increase following Roe v. Wade and did schools integrate
following Brown? These questions, although important in our understanding of the Court’s
power and role in society, are distinct from the concept of legitimacy, which pertains to a
psychological ascription. Though these concepts are related, there are important differences
between the two that preclude their interchangeability.

1.4.4

Legitimacy and Judicial Supremacy

In addition to judicial power, there is another line of research tangentially pertaining to
legitimacy, though differing in important respects: the scholarship on judicial supremacy.
Whittington (2007, 6) defines judicial supremacy as, “the obligation of coordinate officials
not only to obey [a judicial] ruling but to follow its reasoning in future deliberations.” Under
13

To be sure, there are those advocating such approaches.
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this view of the constitutional framework, to quote John Marshall, “it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”14 Tracing the doctrine
of judicial supremacy throughout the Country’s history, Whittington (2007) demonstrates
how both the presidency and the Congress have elevated the Court to such a role in the
constitutional order (see also Graber 1993).
Judicial supremacy is related to legitimacy in its deferring of individuals to the demands
of an institution (here, the Supreme Court). Though judicial supremacy is focusing on the
role of other political institutions and actors (Congress and the presidency) vis-á-vis the
Court, legitimacy, as discussed herein, pertains primarily to the relationship between the
public and the Court.
Much like with judicial power, legitimacy can support judicial supremacy, but it does
not require it. Instead, it relies on the internalized feeling of obligation to the demands
of the institution in whatever context the institution attempts to exert authority. In the
United Kingdom, for example, in which parliament is supreme, the Supreme Court is still
legitimate.15 However, what differs between the U.K. and the U.S. Supreme Courts is the role
that they are expected to play in the governing system. As shown by Whittington (2007),
the United States Supreme Court has been thrust on a pedestal making it the supreme
interpreter of the Constitution. This national commitment to judicial supremacy means that
legitimacy manifests in its relationship to that role. In other countries, however, expectations
of courts likely differ. In countries where high courts play a more advisory role, legitimacy
is likely to require opinions to be considered by those to whom they relate. Legitimacy will
manifest differently depending on the expected role of the Court in the governing system
and, importantly, judicial legitimacy exists in countries that do not subscribe to the theory
of judicial supremacy.
14
15

Marbury v. Madison
See Carrington and Sigsworth (2022)
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1.5

Summary, Empirical Expectations, and Plan of the
Dissertation

In this chapter, I have introduced the puzzle that this dissertation seeks to address. Namely,
considerable research argues that legitimacy exists up until people are willing to support or
tolerate institutional change and reform. In the current political climate (and, going back
decades), a sizable amount of the public is willing to tolerate and support these changes.
For the first time in nearly a century, the idea of court packing is mainstream. Court
reform is included in a major party platform, legislation has been introduced to enact term
limits and expand the size of the Court, and the President of the United States created a
commission to study the merits of Court reform. According to extant scholarship, these
efforts at reform signal that the legitimacy of the institution has plummeted. If true, a court
without legitimacy will be unable to conduct its normative business and, having lost its
independence, would become politically, socially, and institutionally irrelevant, all of which
has a detrimental effect on the rule of law and minority rights.
This dissertation takes an alternative approach. Specifically, I argue that this is not the
case and, instead, results from an understanding of legitimacy flawed in several respects: first,
it is not closely connected with the definition of legitimacy that is widely accepted; second,
as noted, it leads to a divergence between empirical reality and theory; third, it precludes
investigating the determinants of legitimacy that have nothing to do with legitimacy; fourth,
it results in scholars focusing attention on determinants of institutional support rather than
determinants of legitimacy; and finally, it prevents scholarly communities that are related
and working on similar questions from engaging with one another.
In contrast to this past scholarship, I argue that an internalized feeling of obligation is
a superior indicator of legitimacy for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that
these attitudes are what allows the Court to fulfil its normative and institutional mandate.
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Without a widespread feeling of obligation, elected officials, litigants, and the public more
broadly are able to easily disregard judicial demands with impunity. When this happens,
the rule of law will suffer. Most importantly, felt obligation is more closely related to the
widely-used understanding of legitimacy, which emphasizes a psychological state of mind.
When we reshape our understanding of legitimacy, it becomes clear that efforts to reform
the institution do not, in fact, threaten its legitimacy. Indeed, there might be a positive
relationship between legitimacy and support for reform. As a result, the current climate
does not signal the collapse of the rule of law and minority rights as we know it but, instead,
shows how thriving the legitimacy of the Supreme Court truly is.
The discussion to this point leads to the following empirical expectations (which will be
better defined in subsequent chapters):

H1: Feeling obligated toward the Court will be positively correlated with support for concrete reform efforts.
H2: Feeling obligated toward the institution will be unrelated to some considerations that
impact institutional support.
H3: Obligation felt toward the institution has an moderating effect on the relationship
between specific support and institutional support.

Now that the puzzle has been presented and the empirical expectations outlined, chapter
two turns attention to measurement. Specifically, I introduce how scholars have conventionally measured institutional support and how it has varied over the decades. Next, the
chapter constructs and validates the questions used to measure obligation felt toward the
Supreme Court. Chapter two concludes by empirically comparing the two batteries of questions statistically. Chapters three and four contain the empirical heart of the project by
evaluating the above expectations using observational and experimental data, respectively.
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Chapter three presents the results of an original, nationally-representative survey whereas
chapter four presents the results from survey experiments.
Finally, chapter five summarizes the dissertation by restating the puzzle, explaining the
findings, further situating the research presented into the existing literature, and discusses
the normative implications of the project in terms of both democratic responsiveness, accountability, minority rights, and the rule of law. Ultimately, this dissertation suggests that
people can attempt to hold the Supreme Court accountable for its decisions without threatening its legitimacy and without harming the rule of law in society. The Supreme Court’s
legitimacy is vast, robust, and thriving, and it is reasonable to expect modest reforms to
make the Court more accountable to the public without it harming its overall legitimacy.
Indeed, changing how we think about legitimacy indicates that it is this treasured attribute
of the Court that is motivating calls for reform.
Overall, this dissertation investigates how judicial legitimacy can exist in an era marked
by calls for court reform and, in doing so, challenges the field of judicial legitimacy by calling
into question the uncritically accepted assumption that to view the Court legitimately is to
support it. This does not mean that past scholarship is not valuable—in fact, without that
scholarship, this dissertation would not be possible. Decades of scholars have devoted their
time, attention, and resources on this important topic because of the impressive normative
stakes for the rule of law, democracy, and minority rights. There is a reason that Gibson,
Caldeira and Baird (1998, 344) call the question of origin and deterioration of institutional
legitimacy “the most important question in legitimacy research.” This dissertation stands on
the shoulders of these giants by attempting to bring their insights into line with our current
empirical reality.
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Chapter 2
How Do we Measure Legitimacy?
On March 20, 1977, the Skokie, Illinois police department received a letter from Frank Collin
informing them that the National Socialist Party—also known as the Nazi Party—would be
marching through town on May 1st. In sending the letter, Collin kicked off a pivotal case
in free expression jurisprudence ultimately culminating in a U.S. Supreme Court decision1
affirming the constitutional rights of Nazis to march through the streets of a small Illinois
village (Strum, 1999). In addition, the public response to this controversy offers a glimpse
into how judicial legitimacy might manifest in the real world and, related, how it should be
measured.
Although Collin proudly wore the label of Nazi and revered Adolf Hitler, he claimed
not to advocate for the death of Jews. Strum (1999, 1) recounts that Collin “believed that
Jews and African Americans were biologically inferior and that the only way the United
States could remain strong was to deprive Jews of citizenship and send all black Americans
back to Africa.” In his letter to Skokie, Collin claimed that the Nazis would gather in
front of Village Hall at 3pm and protest on the sidewalk carrying signs displaying “White
Free Speech,” “Free Speech For White Americans,” and “Free Speech for the White Man.”
1

National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
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Moreover, although the Nazis would be marching in uniforms—including a swastika emblem
on the armband—Collin made it a point in his letter to underscore that demonstrators would
make no derogatory remarks toward any religious group (Neier, 1979, 47).
Unsurprisingly, the threat of a Nazi march in a suburb heavily populated by survivors of
the Holocaust, and subsequent court decisions clearing the way for the march to proceed2 ,
provoked a backlash. The Illinois chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
took up the case on behalf of Frank Collin, which resulted in the organization facing severe
financial consequences as its membership dropped significantly. As told by Neier (1979, 9091), although the ACLU board of directors was unanimous in its decision to take up the
Skokie case, this decision “probably cost the ACLU about 30,000 members,” which, at the
time, was about 15 percent of its total membership.
People also responded negatively to the courts getting involved and affirming the rights
of the Nazis, and many let their displeasure be known. “It’s a shame! and a disgrace!” a
constituent wrote to Illinois Governor James Thompson, “the Courts have agreed to permit
Swastika-bearing Nazis to march through Skokie.”3 They went on to say that,

This offensive march will only cause discord, ill-feelings, and eventual violence, so
the courts don’t honestly believe in law and order, they believe in mob assembly.
These marching Nazi ni***rs4 should be put in their place now, otherwise force
will be used to stop their nasty demonstrations. Jews don’t march through
their towns, how come these undesirable instigators have the guts to “disturb
the peace” of Skokie. It’s your responsibility to cancel this march; because the
courts are not reliable. Didn’t these same courts allow integration and bussing
by Blacks etc. ruin our cities; so please stop violence from occuring [sic] and save
2

The march never actually took place even after judicial review.
Excerpts from constituent letters are from the Illinois State Archives, Springfield, Illinois. Visited in
January 2018. Photocopies available.
4
Censorship added.
3
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your face, as a good governor.

Another constituent wrote the governor saying that, “Despite the Supreme Court ruling
on the Nazi march, scheduled for July 4th, I urge you to use your good office to postpone
indefinitely this demonstration.” Another called for Governor Thompson to “do all you
can to limit the activities of the American Nazi Party in Skokie.” Yet another concerned
constituent wrote the governor to express her feeling “that our system of government is
faltering. Judges say, not to allow the Nazi’s to march in Skokie would be denying them
their constitutional rights. I say if the Nazi group wants to march to honor Adolph Hitler..let
them, but only in Germany.”
Not all letters wanted to throw the court decisions to the wind, however, choosing,
instead, to recognize the courts’ legitimacy and work within its confines. The River Grove
Post of The American Legion adopted a resolution, dated May 11, 1978, “petition[ing] the
9th District, as well as the Department of Illinois in their convention assembled to adopt
a firm Resolution and demand upon the United State Supreme Court to reconsider their
earlier matter wherein the so-called American Nazi Party has the benefit of honest citizens
notwithstanding its avowed purpose of discrimination, segregation and genocide of unwanted
persons; they being the judge as to who are unwanted persons.” Another constituent wrote
that they were “saddened to read that the Nazis will be permitted to march in Skokie in
accordance with the First Amendment—a “right” which they would deprive other citizens
of.” This innovative constituent went on to propose that the “state of Illinois force, either
in or out of uniforms, should accompany the marchers from their head quarters.” The
same constituent went on to suggest “hav[ing] these “invaders” accompanied by scores of
ambulances—to act as a sobering element to all concerned.”5
These letters offer a unique perspective into the contours and manifestations of judicial
legitimacy. While writing their letters, several constituents urged the governor to cast aside
5

Underline in original letter.
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the recent judicial decisions protecting the rights of the Nazi Party and to continue to prevent
a demonstration from taking place. This is not too surprising given the extensive research on
tolerance which shows that people often oppose extending rights to their least favored group
even when they might support “tolerance” in the abstract (Nelson, Clausen and Oxley, 1997).
However, while some letter writers challenged the court decisions and urged the governor
to cast them aside, others took a more legitimacy-affirming route by calling on the courts
to reconsider their earlier decisions in the hope that doing so would result in a different
outcome. Some even went so far as to accept that a march would take place, but to offer
alternatives to dampen the effects that such a demonstration would have.
Why did some constituents directly urge the casting aside of a court opinion while others advocated for working within the existing structure of legitimacy? I argue that these
disparate responses underscore the importance of felt obligation toward the courts. More
importantly, they highlight the conditions under which courts become normatively, politically, and socially insignificant and when they can still function. Courts that are conferred
enough legitimacy to be offered the chance to reconsider an earlier decision—as opposed to
simply being ignored or being viewed as merely suggesting outcomes—can still effectively
function as a court.
Having introduced the puzzle of the dissertation and some of the expectations from the
new framework in Chapter 1, the purpose of this chapter is to dive into the empirics. Specifically, I will discuss the measurement of legitimacy, both how it has historically been measured
and how it should be measured as felt obligation. This chapter will also construct and validate a felt obligation battery to be used throughout the remainder of the dissertation. I will
also empirically compare the two batteries to see how they relate to each other. Ultimately,
this chapter lays the empirical foundation by explaining and constructing what are to be the
dependent variables for what follows.
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2.1

Past Efforts at Measuring Legitimacy

Ever since the publication of Easton’s seminal work on support of political systems, and as
recounted at length in Chapter 1, researchers interested in legitimacy of the Supreme Court
have adopted his view that there are two types of support: specific and diffuse (Easton, 1965,
1975). Even so, the way researchers have understood and characterized each of the types of
support has varied greatly, as has the line distinguishing the two. As a result, the way these
concepts are measured varies greatly, too. Indeed, it is quite striking how the concept has
evolved over the decades.
Drawing on Easton’s work, Murphy and Tanenhaus (1968, 370) first define specific support as, “the extent to which people praise or or criticize particular decisions and the performance of individual justices.” Conversely, diffuse support is understood to be “...the degree
to which the Supreme Court is thought to carry out its overall responsibilities in an impartial
and competent fashion” (Murphy and Tanenhaus, 1968, 373). Using early time-series of the
American National Election Survey, the authors measure diffuse support using at least one
of two questions6 :

“Some people think that the Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics. Others
don’t feel that way. How about you? Do you think the Supreme Court gets too
mixed up in politics or not?” and “How well do you think the Supreme Court
does this job; very well or not very well?” (referring to a question asked earlier
in the survey)

Years later, the authors measured7 diffuse support using a battery of four questions
measuring: “(1) how well the Court had been doing its job; (2) whether the Court was too
6

From the article: “Each person who answered at least one of these questions was positioned on a fivepoint scale...’ (Murphy and Tanenhaus, 1968, 373).
7
This article does not discuss their conceptualization of diffuse support, only its measurement.
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much involved in partisan politics; (3) whether it was basically fair in its decisions; and (4)
the relative degree of trust in Congress as opposed to the Court” (Tanenhaus and Murphy,
1981, 27).8 In the same article, specific support is conceptualized as “..evaluations of the
Court’s particular decisions and politics” (Tanenhaus and Murphy, 1981, 31).
The subsequent decade resulted in yet another understanding of institutional support;
one which would take hold. Caldeira and Gibson (1992, 637) argue that specific support
comprises “...a set of attitudes toward an institution based upon the fulfillment of demands
for particular policies or actions.” Diffuse support, on the other hand, is “a reservoir of
favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which
they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants” (quoting
Easton (1965, 273)).
Taking issue with the previous efforts at measuring diffuse support, such as past attempts
inadvertently including indicators of specific support, Caldeira and Gibson (1992, 638) argue
that, “To capture the enduring components of public evaluations of the Court, we need to
pose respondents with tough questions about their willingness to accept, make, or countenance major changes in fundamental attributes of how the high bench functions or fits into
the U.S. Constitutional system.”9 The authors go on to note that, instead of focusing on the
ability of the Supreme Court to legitimize unpopular policies, “we spotlight the ability of
the Court to maintain itself in the face of its own unpopular rulings” (Caldeira and Gibson,
1992, 638).
To quantify such attitudes, Caldeira and Gibson (1992) measure “willingness to support
elemental changes in the powers, process, and structures of the high bench” (639). Specifically, respondents were asked:
8

The last question was later disavowed by the authors as a measure of diffuse support.
They also turn to the history of FDR’s Court packing plan to substantiate the need to focus on institutional maintenance (Caldeira and Gibson, 1992; Caldeira, 1987).
9
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1) The power of the Supreme Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional
should be eliminated; 2) If the Supreme Court continually makes decisions that
the people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Court altogether;
3) It would not make much difference to me if the U.S. Constitution was rewritten
so as to reduce the powers of the Supreme Court; 4) The right of the Supreme
Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be limited by the
Congress; 5) People should be willing to do everything they can to make sure
that any proposal to abolish the Supreme Court is defeated.

Although how scholars convey the distinction between the types of support has changed
through the years10 , the understanding of diffuse support as being institutional maintenance
took root in the literature and remains the conventional approach to this day, and has been
applied to non-U.S. Supreme Court contexts, as well (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998;
Gibson and Caldeira, 1998; Caldeira and Gibson, 1995).
While the understanding of legitimacy as institutional support/maintenance remains unchanged, the specific battery of questions used to quantify support has changed slightly
from the initial understanding elucidated in the early 1990s. The most widely-used battery
is found in Gibson, Caldeira and Spence (2003), which offered up a six-question approach:

1) If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people
disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether;
2) The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues
10

A few years later, Gibson and Nelson (2015, 164) would define the distinction between specific and
diffuse support differently, with specific support encompassing a lot more than earlier explications. While
specific support is concerned with satisfaction with policy outputs, it also, “...reflect[s] other considerations,
including satisfaction with how decisions are made, the speed and alacrity with which they are made, how
litigants are treated, how the opinion is written, and the overall context of the institution” (Gibson and
Nelson, 2015, 164). They go on to say that “Perhaps, for some, dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court
has nothing at all to do with the ideological makeup of its decisions, but is based instead on the fact that
it makes so few decisions per term. Dissatisfaction may also stem from the actions of the justices, such as
writing books for profit, going duck hunting, disagreeing in public with the president, or refusing to televise
its proceedings” (164).
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should be reduced; 3) The Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole; 4) The decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court favor some groups more than others; 5) The U.S. Supreme Court
gets too mixed up in politics; 6) The U.S. Supreme Court should have the right to
say what the Constitution means, even when the majority of the people disagree
with the Court’s decision.”

While offering up this battery of questions as a measure of diffuse support for the Court,
Gibson, Caldeira and Spence importantly distinguish institutional support from confidence
in the institution. Past scholars would occasionally use confidence in the Court as a measure
of legitimacy, in large part, due to its ubiquity in surveys. For example, the General Social
Survey (GSS) includes the confidence question for each cross-section since 1974 with one
exception (1985). Even so, Gibson, Caldeira and Spence (2003) taught us that this measure
is more closely related to immediate satisfaction with outputs than long-term evaluations as
legitimacy theory requires (Carrington and Sigsworth, 2022, 6). They further note that the
confidence questions often strongly correlate across institutions, indicating that the questions
tap into more general confidence in institutions rather than institution-specific attitudes
(Gibson, Caldeira and Spence, 2003, 354-355).
The battery of questions offered in Gibson, Caldeira and Spence (2003) was later modified
to exclude the “Court can be trusted” question, which was argued to be an indicator of
specific support and not institutional support (Gibson, 2011). Indeed, Gibson and Nelson
(2015) argue that a primary reason that Bartels and Johnson (2013) find a strong relationship
between policy outputs and diffuse support is because their legitimacy battery included
questions gauging “trust” in the Court. Even with these modifications, using batteries of
questions designed to quantify institutional support—a defense of the Court—has become
commonplace in the literature.
But our story doesn’t end there! Recently, some concern has been raised about the level
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of abstractness of the ubiquitous battery of questions. Badas (2019) argues, for example,
that the existing battery of questions is too abstract for the average survey respondent
and, as a result, previous studies relying on such measures overstate public support for
the Court while simultaneously understating the extent to which the public is willing to
hold the Court accountable for unpopular decisions. In contrast to the traditional battery of
questions, Badas advocates for the use of an “applied legitimacy index,” which is designed to
tap into respondents support of concrete efforts at reform of the Court (such as term limits,
mandatory retirement ages, and Court expansion). While Badas challenges the questions
used to measure legitimacy, he nevertheless accepts that institutional (diffuse) support—
understood as a willingness to resist altering the Court—is the proper understanding of
legitimacy, following in the Easton tradition outlined earlier.
The level of abstractness in survey questions can have serious implications for the conclusions drawn from studies (Carrington and French, 2022). Looking at whether the Kavanaugh
confirmation affected support for the Court, for example, Krewson and Schroedel (2020)
find little meaningful effect using a variation of the traditional institutional support battery.
However, using questions more aligned with the applied legitimacy index, Carrington and
French (2021) find a significant effect of Kavanaugh favorability on respondents’ willingness
to defend the Court from term limits and mandatory retirement ages.
To summarize to this point, the only debate within the literature when it comes to
quantifying legitimacy for the U.S. Supreme Court revolves around the level of abstractness
in the questions. No debate currently exists about whether legitimacy is best understood
as institutional (diffuse) support, or whether this is best understood to be a willingness
to defend the Court from meaningful alterations. However, as noted in Chapter 1, even
the Eastonian framework understands legitimacy as distinct from diffuse support, with the
former potentially—but not necessarily—being a cause of the latter (Easton, 1965, 282).
This point of departure allows us to reconsider whether legitimacy is best understood as
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diffuse support. As I have argued, it is not. Instead, the better measure is felt obligation,
as several years of theorizing about the function of legitimacy draws attention to this fundamental attribute and its usefulness to the efficacy of governing regimes.11 The next section
explains how this felt obligation is quantified in the chapters to come.

2.2

Measuring Felt Obligations

Like the existing approach, the best way to measure how obligated an individual feels toward
the Supreme Court is by using a battery of questions. Measuring the same underlying
phenomenon using a variety of questions helps reduce measurement error. To begin this
process, I first identified a series of questions from the existing literature. These questions
were altered when necessary and paired with original questions, all of which were designed
to measure people’s internalized obligation felt toward the Supreme Court. In total, eight
questions were identified which measured various dimensions of peoples’ internalized feeling
of obligation felt toward the Supreme Court. Importantly, these questions were selected
with an eye toward the various contours and manifestations of felt obligation, including how
an individual perceives themselves vis-à-vis the Court, what they feel is their responsibility
when an elected official thwarts the Court, and how they perceive those who advocate for
outright ignoring of the Court.
Next, these questions were then analyzed with the hope of validating their psychometric
properties and also to identify the most effective questions with the goal of reducing the total
number of questions in the battery. More information on this process is presented below.
11

To quote Easton (1965, 279-280) “Regardless of what the members may feel about the wisdom of the
actions of authorities, obedience may flow from some rudimentary convictions about the appropriateness of
the political order of things. One simply ought to obey the authorities and abide by the basic political rules;
no alternative is conceivable since it is the right thing to do. They are legitimate”
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2.2.1

Validating Through Cognitive Interviewing

Before any of the eight questions could be included in a battery measuring felt obligation, it
was necessary to ensure their internal validity by investigating the mental processes taking
place when people read the question. To this end, I fielded a study to determine how well
the questions fit together and the mental processes undertaken by respondents when they
read the question. This process is also referred to as “cognitive interviewing.”
Cognitive interviewing is, “the administration of draft survey questions while collecting
additional verbal information about survey responses, which is used to evaluate the quality
of the response or to help determine whether the question is generating the information that
its author intends” (Beatty and Willis, 2007, 287). The purpose, then, is to get a glimpse
into the mind of respondents as they answer questions in an effort to ensure the internal
validity of questions that could eventually construct the felt obligation battery. Given the
ubiquity of the existing “institutional support” battery of questions measuring legitimacy
and the resulting status quo bias, it is critical to ensure that respondents are understanding
any new questions in the appropriate manner and to ensure the internal and measurement
validity of any proposed battery.
Ordinarily, cognitive interviewing takes place in small (5-15 person) groups in a faceto-face laboratory setting (Willis, 2005). However, because of the COVID-19 pandemic,
such a focus group was impossible. Fortunately, recent scholarship demonstrates that online
cognitive interviewing techniques (occasionally referred to as “online probing”) can be equally
effective at identifying problematic questions and suggested revisions (Meitinger and Behr,
2016; Lenzner and Neuert, 2017).
Online cognitive pretesting has several advantages to its face-to-face counterpart: first,
the cost and time commitment is significantly less online than in a laboratory. While traditional cognitive interviewing can take an hour or longer to complete, online probing can
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be done in a matter of minutes from the comfort of a participant’s own home. This reduced time commitment results in a reduced compensation for participants allowing the
researcher to collect additional data than if the study were done face-to-face. Second, and
importantly, online cognitive interviewing helps reduce the prevalence of “false positives,”
where respondents being interviewed spot issues with survey questions because they feel that
the researcher observing them wants them to.12 Finally, online cognitive probing also expands the geographic distribution of respondents. While traditional face-to-face interviews
are limited to the immediate geographical region, online probing is not similarly confined.
One large downside to online cognitive pretesting when compared to the traditional
method is the inability to engage in live probing of respondents. Traditionally, when a respondent offers an answer that is vague or incomplete, the (trained) interviewer can probe
the respondent for further information to better get at their thoughts (Willis, 2005). Questions like “what did you mean by that?” and “how does that make you feel?” allow for the
collection of more data and a stronger confidence in the validity of the survey item.
In an online format, this feature is not readily available. Instead, all probes must be
anticipated in advanced and programmed into the survey software. The need to anticipate
in advance, however, has the advantage of systematizing all interviews. While face-to-face
methods allow for live probing, the practice of live probing by its very nature opens the door
for interviewer effects and bias. These concerns are not as prevalent in an online environment
which does not allow live probing.
In the study, each of the 8 potential multiple choice legitimacy questions were followed
by anywhere between 3 to 5 probing questions.13 These probes were designed to measure the
four primary considerations of survey questions: comprehension, retrieval, estimation, and
response (Boeije and Willis, 2013). Each question and its subsequent probes comprises a
12

This might also be called a type-one or type-two error, but, because I believe in being the change you
want to see in the world, I will simply call this a “false positive.”
13
A special thanks to Emily Thorson who offered advice on the probing questions.
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Figure 2.1: Example probe question during the cognitive interviewing.
“set,” and each respondent in the study answered two (2) sets. As a result, respondents could
have answered anywhere between six to ten questions in total, not counting demographic
questions included in the study. An example of a probe question is shown in Figure 2.1, and
a full list of questions and probes can be found in the appendix. Importantly, Neuert and
Lenzner (2019) find no relationship between the number of open-ended probe questions and
quality of respondents’ answers on a range of indicators, such as respondent nonresponse,
dropouts, word counts, response times, and themes identified in the responses. In total,
412 respondents participated in the cognitive interview study which took place on the Lucid
surveying platform (Coppock and McClellan, 2019). Upon completion, open-ended responses
to the probe questions were organized by educational attainment to verify consistency in
survey interpretation across education groups.14
14

These data will not be published, though the categorizing spreadsheet with answers is available for
viewing upon request.
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Analyzing the Cognitive Interviews

As noted above, the goal of cognitive interviewing is to make sure respondents are interpreting survey items in a similar manner and in a way that is consistent with how the researcher
believes them to interpret. To analyze the open-ended responses, I sorted responses by educational attainment and conducted a “medium-n” qualitative analysis by looking for patterns
and anomalies across respondent groups.15 Special attention was paid to making sure that
the comprehension, retrieval, estimation, and response of respondents was similar at various
levels of educational attainment (Boeije and Willis, 2013). Additionally, respondents were
provided with an open-ended question asking if they had any doubts about their responses
to the question, and responses to this question factored heavily into the design of the final
battery.
Based on the results from the cognitive interviewing and the results of the quantitative
factor analysis (next section), the following questions were selected to comprise the battery:

1. “Even if a majority of citizens disagree with its decisions, people should still comply
with decisions issued by the United States Supreme Court.”
2. “Decisions by the United States Supreme Court should be considered final and authoritative.”
3. “If necessary, people have an obligation to pressure politicians to comply with decisions
by the United States Supreme Court.”
4. “People should obey the Supreme Court even if it goes against what they think is
right.”
15

Because of the small number of respondents in each proposed question, analysis by other group identities
(such as race) was not permitted. Future research should expand the size of the interviews and over-sample
minority respondents to ensure that they interpret the survey items similarly.
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5. “People who openly advocate for ignoring a Supreme Court ruling are a threat to the
rule of law in our country.”

Among the questions that were discarded, serious questions emerged about the consistency of responses across educational attainment and concerns with vagueness. For example,
the question asking whether it is okay for politicians to ignore decisions by the Court if they
are doing what they think is best for the country elicited different responses among highereducated respondents. Those with a high school degree often mentioned doing what is in the
politicians’ best interest and mentioned power or pandering. In contrast, higher educated
respondents often mentioned the common good, best interest of the country as a whole,
and the like. On the same question, many respondents discussed how their response to the
question would vary if they had additional facts and how the question was vague.
The question asking, “Sometimes elected officials need to ignore decisions by the Supreme
Court, and that is okay” was discarded as being poorly worded. Its focus on “elected officials” omitted appointed government officials, which was made apparent during the cognitive
interviewing. Finally, the question asking “”Sometimes, the Supreme Court is wrong and,
when this happens, it is okay to ignore its decision” elicited vastly different conceptualizations of what it means for the Court to be “wrong.” Many respondents focused on policy,
while others focused on morality and ethics. On the same question, several respondents
interpreted “ignore” to mean “to protest openly and disagree with” the decision (to use a
representative example). Finally, some respondents complained that the question was poorly
worded.

2.2.2

Validation Through Numbers

Following the cognitive interviewing, a second study was conducted in which the felt obligation questions were presented to 490 new respondents along with the traditional institutional
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support questions. The purpose of this second study was to statistically validate the battery
and see how the proposed battery relates to the traditional measure.16 All questions were
recoded such that higher values indicate greater legitimacy and were rescaled to range from
zero to one.

Correlations

First, to see how well the questions correlate with each other, a correlation matrix was
constructed for both batteries of questions, individually and combined. The results of the
traditional battery of questions is presented below in Table 2.2. Due to space constraints,
variable names in the tables refer to the questions in the Table 2.1.
Interesting enough, the fifth question “The U.S. Supreme Court should have the right to
say what the Constitution means, even when the majority of the people disagree with the
Court’s decision” is negatively correlated with the other questions. The correlations for the
felt obligation battery is presented below in Table 2.3. The correlation matrix below indicates
that each of the questions is positively correlated with the other, and this correlation ranges
from .30 to .51.
Finally, to see how the questions comprising each battery relate to each other, all of the
questions were included together, producing the correlation matrix shown below in Table
2.4.

16

Because respondents need to respond to all eight proposed questions and all of the traditional questions,
and because the cognitive interviewing only asked respondents about two questions, it was impossible to do
these in a single study. Asking the traditional questions before the new questions risks priming respondents
and altering the results. Likewise, asking about all eight proposed questions before circling back to probe
on two of those questions might bias the results. Consequently, two studies were necessary: one aimed at
probing, the other aimed at quantifying.
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Variable
Name
DS1

DS2
DS3
DS4
DS5

Comp1

Comp2
Comp3
Comp4
Comp5

Question Wording
“If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that
most people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the
Supreme Court altogether.”
“The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced.”
“The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court favor some groups more
than others.”
“”The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.”
“The U.S. Supreme Court should have the right to say what the
Constitution means, even when the majority of the people disagree
with the Court’s decision.”
“Even if a majority of citizens disagree with its decisions, people should still comply with decisions issued by the United States
Supreme Court.”
“Decisions by the United States Supreme Court should be considered final and authoritative.”
“If necessary, people have an obligation to pressure politicians to
comply with decisions by the United States Supreme Court.”
“People should obey the Supreme Court even if it goes against what
they think is right.”
“People who openly advocate for ignoring a Supreme Court ruling
are a threat to the rule of law in our country.”

Table 2.1: Table showing the variable names and their corresponding survey question.
Table 2.2:
Variables
DS1
DS2
DS3
DS4
DS5

Traditional Battery
DS1 DS2 DS3
1.00
0.57 1.00
0.38 0.44 1.00
0.32 0.42 0.40
-0.02 0.01 -0.06

Correlations
DS4 DS5

1.00
-0.07

1.00

Table 2.3: Felt Obligation Correlations
Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5
Comp1
1.00
Comp2
0.52
1.00
Comp3
0.36
0.33
1.00
Comp4
0.49
0.46
0.34
1.00
Comp5
0.47
0.41
0.30
0.36
1.00
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Variables
DS1
DS2
DS3
DS4
DS5
Comp1
Comp2
Comp3
Comp4
Comp5

DS1
1.00
0.57
0.38
0.32
-0.02
-0.06
-0.13
-0.08
-0.10
-0.09
1.00
0.44 1.00
0.42 0.40 1.00
0.01 -0.06 -0.07
-0.02 -0.00 -0.06
-0.03 -0.04 -0.02
-0.02 -0.01 -0.12
-0.05 -0.01 -0.07
-0.07 -0.03 -0.06

DS2

1.00
0.48
0.47
0.38
0.37
0.37
1.00
0.52
0.36
0.49
0.47
1.00
0.33
0.46
0.41

Table 2.4: Combined Correlations
DS3 DS4 DS5 Comp1 Comp2

1.00
0.34
0.30

Comp3

1.00
0.36

Comp4

1.00

Comp5

A few things stand out from the combined correlation matrix. First, with the exception
of the fifth institutional support question, the questions comprising the traditional battery
are negatively correlated with the questions comprising the new felt obligation battery. This
suggests that as the obligation people feel toward the Court increase, their willingness to
defend the Court from changes decreases. Second, the fifth institutional support question
(quote above) is positively correlated with the proposed felt obligation questions. This
indicates that felt obligation is at least partially encapsulated in the existing battery, though
it runs in the opposite direction of the other questions in the battery.

Exploratory Factor Analysis

While the correlations offer rudimentary support for the theory espoused in Chapter 1,
further analysis is necessary to investigate the structure of these questions. Specifically,
the two batteries of questions were analyzed using an exploratory factor analysis. More
information on this is presented below.
First, an unrotated principal-component factor analysis returns two latent factors, with
the Eigenvalues: 3.12, 2.20, and 0.81, respectively. Analyzing the question loadings confirms
the results of the correlation matrices above: first, each of the questions load into their
respective factor with the exception of the fifth institutional support question, which loads
onto the felt obligation dimension. The factor loadings are reproduced below in Table 2.5.
After an orthogonal varimax rotation, however, the questions load even better onto their
respective batteries, again with the exception of the fifth traditional question. The results
after rotating are presented in Table 2.6.
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Variable
DS1
DS2
DS3
DS4
DS5
Comp1
Comp2
Comp3
Comp4
Comp5

Factor 1
-0.28
-0.22
-0.19
-0.24
0.69
0.76
0.74
0.60
0.70
0.67

Factor 2
0.71
0.79
0.71
0.64
0.20
0.20
0.16
0.11
0.14
0.12

Uniqueness
0.42
0.32
0.47
0.53
0.37
0.37
0.43
0.63
0.50
0.54

Table 2.5: Results of a principal-component analysis of the legitimacy batteries.

Variable
DS1
DS2
DS3
DS4
DS5
Comp1
Comp2
Comp3
Comp4
Comp5

Factor 1
-0.08
0.00
0.01
-0.06
0.72
0.79
0.75
0.61
0.71
0.67

Factor 2
0.76
0.82
0.73
0.69
0.01
-0.01
-0.04
-0.06
-0.05
-0.06

Uniqueness
0.42
0.32
0.47
0.53
0.48
0.37
0.43
0.63
0.50
0.54

Table 2.6: Results of a principal-component analysis of the legitimacy batteries with orthogonal varimax rotation.
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2.3

What have we learned?

This chapter begins the empirical component of the dissertation and offers several contributions. The chapter begins by tracing the measurement of legitimacy through the ages,
focusing on how scholars have historically characterized the distinction between “specific”
and “diffuse” support highlighting the various ways that each has evolved over time. This
chapter also lays the foundation for the empirical work in the chapters to come. Specifically,
it constructs and validates a new battery of questions designed to measure how obligated
people feel toward the Supreme Court which, as argued in Chapter 1, is a more preferred
indicator of legitimacy. After tracing the history of efforts to measure legitimacy, and offering a new measure, the chapter then compares how the new battery relates to the historical
measures.
Several important findings stand out from the statistical comparison between the two
batteries. First, one of the questions used in the historical institutional support battery is
negatively correlated with the others in the battery. Second, this question loads onto the
felt obligation factor in a principle component analysis. Aside from this one exception, the
other questions load nicely into their respective batteries, and the felt obligation battery is
negatively correlated to the institutional support battery. Finally, because an orthogonal
varimax rotation causes the questions to load even better on their respective batteries, it
suggests that the latent structures between the two batteries is orthogonal.
The following chapters put this new measure of legitimacy to the test, first by using
a nationally-representative survey and then with a series of experiments. These upcoming
chapters focus on the role that elite signals play in shaping public support for the Court, with
a focus on comparing the legitimacy measures. The next chapter begins my highlighting the
importance of signals for the Supreme Court’s legitimacy and focuses on two ubiquitousbut-understudied signals: that the Court is hostile to group interests, and that it is in need
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of being fixed. Ultimately, although the results of the observational data support the theory
that institutional support is influenced by factors that do not influence felt obligation, the
experimental results do not. The concluding chapter of the dissertation contextualizes these
findings and discusses potential explanations for these contradictory findings, what they
mean for the theory, and expectations going forward.
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Chapter 3
A Survey Investigating the Flexibility
of Felt Obligation and Institutional
Support
The information environment surrounding the Supreme Court is saturated with various elite
signals. On March 27, 2021, for example, Vox correspondent Ian Millhiser published an
article entitled, “The Supreme Court’s Coming War with Joe Biden, Explained” (Millhiser,
2021). The article argues that enough conservative justices have signaled their willingness
to embrace a relatively new legal concept known as “nondelegation” that some of the more
ambitious parts of President Biden’s agenda could be dead on arrival at the Court. Although
earlier conservative movements embraced the administrative state as a tool for deregulation,
Millhiser notes that an embracing of the nondelegation doctrine by the Supreme Court would
dismantle most of the modern regulatory state as unconstitutional. As if the article’s subtitle
was ineffective at getting the point across (“The Supreme Court is poised to give itself a veto
power over much of the Biden administration’s authority”), he drives the nail home in the
text, noting, “...no matter what issue you care about, there is likely a federal regulation that
51

shapes the nation’s approach to that issue. If the Supreme Court strips the government of
much of its power to promulgate these regulations, it could effectively grind down the Biden
presidency — not to mention dismantle much of American law” (Millhiser, 2021).
Millhiser is not alone in signaling the damage that a conservative Supreme Court can
do to a Democratic president’s agenda. Writing in the Washington Post and drawing on
the history of partisan justices thwarting the ability of elected representatives to respond
to the electorate’s wishes, Thomas Keck argues that the justices themselves are ultimately
responsible should Court reform ever actually happen. As he argues, “if the justices want
to safeguard their independence, the court must give the elected branches the room to
respond to the popular will” (Keck, 2018). In a chapter-length version of a similar argument,
Keck (2022) argues that the contemporary Supreme Court’s willingness to serve as agents
of democratic backsliding (by striking down key provisions of the Voting Rights Act, for
example) means that efforts at reform in service of democratic preservation might be the
“least-bad” option to restoring the Court.
Elected officials also signal about what the Court might do in the future, such as when
then-President Elect Joe Biden warned the country that the Supreme Court might strip
healthcare away from millions of people.1 Raising the salience of what the Court might do
in the future is not solely a Democratic or liberal endeavor, either. Following a series of
losses at the Court, then-President Donald Trump expressed his anger in no-longer-available
tweets arguing that everything Conservatives hold near-and-dear was in danger. “The recent
Supreme Court decisions, not only on DACA, Sanctuary Cities, Census, and others, tell you
one thing, we need NEW JUSTICES of the Supreme Court.” A follow-up tweet stated, “If
the Radical Left Democrats assume power, your Second Amendment, Right to Life, Secure
Borders, and Religious Liberty, among other things, are OVER and GONE!” (Shaw, 2020).
Nor are the signals about future Court decisions necessarily all negative, at least among
1

“Biden Defends Obamacare as Top Court Hears Case.” BBC. 10 November 2020.
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Republicans. Senator Josh Hawley, for example, has said that he will only vote to confirm
justices to the Court who agree that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided, echoing a promise
made by President Trump in the 2016 election in which he promised to appoint justices to
the Court that will overturn Roe (Mangan, 2016).
Beyond signaling that the Court might do something noteworthy in the future, another
prevalent signal is found in sensationalist headlines declaring the Court “broken” or in need
of being “fixed.” Writing in Vox, for example, Dan Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman proclaim
their idea on “How to Save the Supreme Court” (Epps and Sitaraman, 2018). A few years
later, Dan Epps argues that “The Supreme Court is Leaking. That’s a good thing”(Epps,
2020). Garrett Epps, writing in The Atlantic and quoting an amicus brief filed by Democratic
senators, proclaims that “The Supreme Court is Not Well. And the People Know It” (Epps,
2019). Writing an amicus brief to the Court in a gun rights case, these Senators warned the
Court that “The Supreme Court is not well. And the people know it. Perhaps the Court
can heal itself before the public demands it be ‘restructured in order to reduce the influence
of politics”’ (Whitehouse et al., 2019). As if that’s not enough, David Litt proclaims his
version of “How to Fix the Supreme Court,” arguing that it would not require a constitutional
amendment (Litt, 2020).
Perhaps the highest-profile signal yet that something is remiss with the Supreme Court
came from President Biden when he established a presidential commission to study Court
reform. In their final report, the Commission discussed term lengths, the Court’s emergency
docket, Court expansion, and other issues surrounding the Court. On the other end of
Pennsylvania Avenue, several Democratic members of Congress introduced legislation to
expand the size of the Supreme Court.2 All of these signals indicate to the mass public—
especially fellow Democratic partisans—that the Court is damaged and could benefit from
some sort of reform.
2

Press Release: Expand the Supreme Court. April 15, 2021.
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The information environment surrounding the Court is arguably more important than
with any other branch of the federal government, particularly because the Court, unlike
Congress and the White House, rarely engages in public relations campaigns (Strother,
2017). Justices are not going on Sunday morning talk shows with regularity to tout their
latest opinions to the masses, explain the reasoning underlying their most recent decision, or
to correct the record when people, perhaps intentionally, misrepresent or malign the Court.
Instead, they prefer to rely on elites, whether media, partisan, or activists, to convey the
day-to-day happenings at the Court. To be sure, the justices do give speeches and appear
in public. But, when they do, such speeches attempt to reinforce the Court’s legitimacy in
the eyes of their audience (Glennon and Strother, 2019). Additionally, the reach of their
public appearances is limited since the justices most often speak at exclusive events with
specialized audiences, such as law school commencements or legal organization events. In
fact, when justices speak to such audiences, the media are sometimes barred from attending,
as was the case when Justice Gorsuch spoke to the Federalist Society in 2022.
The Court’s reliance on the information environment offers an interesting opportunity
to evaluate the expectations discussed in Chapter 1 about the nature of felt obligation.
Consequently, this chapter has two goals. First, because of the importance of the information
environment to the Court, it is imperative to understand how these understudied signals
matter for public perceptions of, and support for, the institution. While significant research
has been conducted on the relationship between the media environment and perceptions of
the Court, most of these studies focus on the environment after a judgement has been handed
down. Consequently, this chapter moves the magnifying glass to see how these signals (which
exist independent of the context of a specific Court decision) affect public attitudes toward
the Court. In other words, it is important to understand how both a belief that the Court
is broken and hostile to one’s interests affect support for the institution and the obligation
afforded thereto.

54

Second, a primary theoretical argument of this dissertation is that institutional support
for the Supreme Court is influenced by factors beyond (and unrelated to) felt obligation.
This insight has important downstream consequences when it comes to whether reform
attempts necessarily impale the Court’s ability to function effectively. Specifically, I expect
that both a belief that the Court is broken and that it is hostile to group interests will affect
institutional diffuse support but not the extent to which people feel obligated to the Court.
In other words, concern for what the Court might do in the future, and a worry that the
Court is broken, affect people’s willingness to defend the Court from changes (institutional
support) while leaving the obligation felt toward the Court unchanged.
This chapter begins by recounting the literature on media effects and the Supreme Court.
Special attention is given to the importance of the information environment for the Court
along with how most of the existing studies focus on media effects after a decision has been
rendered while ignoring the two signals identified earlier. Next, I turn to the methods and
present the results of a nationally-representative survey investigating how each of the legitimacy batteries correlates to a belief that the Court is broken or hostile. Finally, the
chapter concludes by contextualizing the findings into the broader literature and project
while setting the stage for the remainder of the dissertation. Ultimately, this chapter underscores the challenges of equating legitimacy with institutional support by arguing that
two understudied factors present in the information environment influence one but not the
other. As a result, supporting reform should not be taken in itself as a sign that legitimacy
has deteriorated. In the process of making this contribution, I evaluate how two previously
understudied but ubiquitous signals influence legitimacy for the Supreme Court.
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3.1

The Media Environment and the Supreme Court

Most people, most of the time, do not care about politics (Carpini and Keeter, 1997; Lupia,
2015). Consumed with the complexities of life, people rely, instead, on signals from trusted
sources to help them form their attitudes and opinions, particularly when asked to respond
in a survey context (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). For the most part, the public is pretty good
at it, too, being able to act as-if fully informed (Lupia, 1994) and responding in aggregate
to shifts in the political world (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, MacKuen and Erickson,
2002).
Because of their centrality to opinion and attitude formation, characteristics of the signals
have also been shown to influence how people respond beyond simply providing information.
For example, framing topics a certain way (Nelson, Clausen and Oxley, 1997) or priming
certain considerations among the audience (Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Druckman, 2001b)
all influence how the public responds. Signaling effects have important limitations, however.
Specifically, the credibility of the source matters (Druckman, 2001a), and attitudes that are
more crystalized are more resistant to such priming and framing considerations.
Although the information environment is important for the government more broadly
and for all institutions, it is of utmost importance for the Supreme Court, as discussed
above. As a result, decades of scholarship has evaluated how media coverage of the Court
influences public perceptions. Recent research in this vein has shown that the increasing
“gamed” coverage of Supreme Court decisions—in terms of which groups “win” and “lose”
at the Court—decreases the legitimacy afforded to the institution (Hitt and Searles, 2018).
Johnston and Bartels (2010) find differential effects in how the media covers the Court and
that these effects influence how the public understands the Court. More generally, Strother
(2017) puts forth a theory of how expected legal and political impact affects how the media
decide which cases to cover. Media coverage has also been shown to be influenced by battles
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among justices and between the Court and other institutions (Johnson and Socker, 2012).
Although the field has been advanced considerably by existing research on the relationship
between the media and the Supreme Court, additional research is needed. Foremost, existing
studies of media and the Court are biased in they almost exclusively focus on the end result
while hardly never (if ever) mentioning the process used to arrive at such outcome.This leaves
our knowledge about the Court’s interaction with the information environment incomplete
by only showing us what happens once a decision has been rendered.
This emphasis on what transpires once a decision has been reached by the Court leaves a
dearth in what we know about how the media influences public perceptions of the institution,
as many signals existing within the information environment outside of an opinion context
that can potentially shape how the public understands the Court. Recognizing the important
of elite signals outside of the case-specific context, Nelson and Gibson (2019) find that attacks
by then-President Donald Trump on the Supreme Court reduced its legitimacy, though any
effects were heavily moderated by perceived source credibility. Despite this important study,
most scholarship on the Court and media effects tend to ignore the broader information
environment around the Court that exists outside of an opinion context.3
This chapter looks at whether, and to what extent, legitimacy for the Supreme Court
is influenced by sensationalist headlines declaring the Court “broken” or in need of being “fixed,” as well as a belief that the Court is hostile to group interests. Both of these
signals are ubiquitous within the information environment surrounding the Court, but we
know nothing about their influence on public perceptions of the institution. In the process,
this research contributes to the broader dissertation by investigating the malleability of the
differing conceptualizations of legitimacy and underscoring the importance of not linking
institutional support to legitimacy.
3
This lack of research is changing, however, with recent studies looking at how public attitudes toward
the Court are influenced by the Chief Justice’s appearance at Trump’s impeachment (Armaly and Enders,
2021) and partisan fighting that takes place upon a vacancy on the Court (Armaly and Lane, 2022).
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3.1.1

A Hostile Court

Because past research has often equated legitimacy with a willingness to support an institution, it has been impossible to determine what predicts support of an institution that is
unrelated to legitimacy. One major factor that may influence institutional support but not
how obligated people feel toward the Court is an anticipation of what the Court will likely
do in the future, what I call court hostility.
The information environment surrounding the Supreme Court is replete with examples
of elites signaling to partisans what the Supreme Court might do in the future. For example,
one Democratic line of attack against Amy Coney-Barrett—whom President Trump nominated to replace the late Justice Ginsburg—was that the Court was scheduled to hear a
challenge to the Affordable Care Act the week following the 2020 General Election. According to Democrats, Republicans were forcing through Coney-Barrett’s nomination because
she could provide the pivotal vote to strike down the Affordable Care Act, not to mention
the influence her judicial philosophy would have on all other cases before a Court split 6–3.
Additionally, concern was raised over how her ascension would affect the outcome of electionrelated litigation surrounding the 2020 General Election. As such, I predict that concern
with what the Court might do in the future is likely to reduce support for the institution.
Even so, I anticipate that how obligated people feel toward the Court will be unaffected
by a concern for what it will do in the future. In other words, a belief that the Court could
be hostile to group goals justifies altering the institution (so as to achieve preferred policy
goals), but it should not go so far as to reduce the obligation felt to the Court. This follows,
I argue, from the crystallized nature of legitimacy: people view changing the Court as a
way to achieve their policy objectives but, nevertheless, feel obligated to the Court until
it is successfully changed.4 Consequently, desiring a change to the Court is not, in itself,
4

See Carrington and Sigsworth (2022, 470) for a discussion of this dynamic as pertains to international
courts.
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indicative of a decrease in legitimacy.
Why might anticipated future decisions matter for supporting reform of the Supreme
Court? One potential pathway is through “prospect theory.” When people are asked to
make decisions involving uncertainty—that is, to make “decisions under risk”—they are not
objective. Instead, whether people expect to receive a gain or loss is important to how
they make decisions when under risk. When in a “domain of losses,” people are more risk
accepting; when in a “domain of gains,” people are more risk averse. This idea is summarized
by Mercer (2005, 3) who notes that “people hate to lose more than they love to win.” This
insight helps explain a range of human attitudes and behaviors, such as why some poor
people will spend their last dollar on a scratch-off lottery ticket while Warren Buffet and Bill
Gates are unlikely to play the lottery.5
Within political science, the ideas of prospect theory have most regularly applied to the
international relations subfield.6 Applying prospect theory to the context of the Supreme
Court via an experiment embedded in the CCES, Braman (2022) finds strong support for
the idea that those who have received past benefits from the Court, and those who anticipate
future benefits, are more resistant to changing the institution, though the findings are most
significant for the future benefits treatments. Consequently, when people feel that the Court
is hostile (placing them in a domain of losses), they are less likely to defend the Court from
changes.
However, it is not clear the extent to which prospect theory applies to how obligated
people feel toward the Court, as Braman (2022) only includes questions about institutional
change and not felt obligation. I argue that felt obligation should be unaffected by perceived
future benefits as, compared to altering the institution, it is a less-risky option and the
nature of legitimacy (consistent with legitimacy theory) means it should be more robust to
5
6

Purely speculating here.
See work by Rose McDermott, for example.
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changes. I theorize that losing the obligation felt toward the Court is more psychologically
challenging than supporting reform efforts.

H1: As perceptions that the Supreme Court is hostile increase, willingness to defend the
Court will decrease.
H2: Obligation felt toward the Supreme Court will be uncorrelated with perceived hostility
of the Court.

Finally, I do expect an important interactive effect between how obligated people feel
toward the Court, on one hand, and perceived hostility of the Court, on the other hand,
such that the more obligated one feels toward the Court, the more they are willing to reduce
institutional support in light of perceived Court hostility. This expectation is the result of
the idea that legitimacy can actually compel support for altering the institution. If this
argument is true, it would be supported by an interactive effect.

H3: Those high in obligation felt toward the Court will withhold greater institutional support when they perceive the Court to be hostile than those who feel low obligation
toward the Court.

3.1.2

Sensationalist Headlines: A Broken Court

As discussed earlier, it is also possible that people worry the Court is on the verge of becoming
broken, damaged, or in other ways in need of being “fixed” or “repaired” as a result of
sensationalist media headlines. Such belief in the Court’s impending doom should affect
institutional support but not felt obligation. To put this another way, when citizens are
being told that the Supreme Court is broken and needs to be fixed, and when a presidential
commission is created to study reform of the Court, they are likely to support institutional
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changes to fix the institution while nevertheless feeling obligated to the demands of the
institution. Like the saying goes, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. But if it is broke, just fix it.”

H4: As a perception that the Court is broken increases, willingness to defend the Court
from changes decreases.
H5: Obligation felt toward the Supreme Court will be uncorrelated with perceived brokenness of the Court.

Finally, another implication of the theory underlying the dissertation is that support for
reform should be uncorrelated with the obligation felt toward the Court or, potentially, even
positively correlated. In other words, if legitimacy can serve as a catalyst for reform, and if
legitimacy is best measured using felt obligation (as I argue in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2),
then we should expect to see a positive relationship between felt obligation and support for
reform.

H6: Obligation felt toward the Supreme Court will be positively correlated with support
for reform attempts.

3.2

Data and Methods

Having outlined the theory and expectations, this section outlines the results from a nonprobability nationally representative survey that was conducted using the Lucid Theorem
platform. This is the same platform discussed in the previous chapter, and so I will simply
remind readers that Lucid quota-samples to match U.S. Census benchmarks (Coppock and
McClellan, 2019).
The study included two attention checks to enhance data quality and, in addition to the
quota sampling provided by Lucid on gender, age, ethnicity, and region, the data are further
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weighted in the analysis to known population parameters on age, race, and education.7 Full
demographic information for both the weighted and unweighted samples can be found in
Table B.1 in the appendix. In total, 2,453 respondents made their way into the survey,
producing 982 completed valid responses.
The dependent variables of interest—institutional support and felt obligation—are measured using their respective batteries. Institutional support was measured as using the
Gibson et al. battery (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence, 2003; Gibson, 2011) and in relation
to concrete reform attempts (Badas, 2019). Felt obligation is measured using the battery
validated in Chapter 2.
The key independent variables of interest—perceived Court hostility and brokenness—
were measured using batteries comprised of no fewer than two questions.8 To measure
concern for how the Court will rule in the future (Court hostility), respondents were asked
how much they agreed with the statements, “The thought of how the Supreme Court will
decide future cases frightens me,” and “I am concerned with how the U.S. Supreme Court
will decide future cases.”9
For perceived brokenness, respondents were asked their agreement with the statements,
“The U.S. Supreme Court is at risk of having its decisions being viewed as optional rather
than required,” “Because of how it has decided recent cases, the Supreme Court is at risk of
becoming obsolete,” and “The Supreme Court is on the verge of becoming irrelevant.”10 To
investigate the theorized interaction effect between concern for future decisions and legitimacy, respondents were asked how much they were concerned that the Supreme Court will
abolish (or get rid of) the right to abortion, same-sex marriage, free speech, and the right
to own guns.
7
Weighting was conducted using iterative proportional fitting, or raking, using the ipfweight package
on Stata. Data were weighted to match U.S. Census information from the 2019 Current Population Survey.
8
To enhance precision while reducing measurement error.
9
α = .86
10
α = .86
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It is worth noting that “brokenness” is both a vague term and hard to define. Additionally, the concept is likely to mean different things to different people. For some, the Court
might be broken because it rules against their preferred policies. For others, it is broken because news headlines and senators tell them so. Given the range of possible interpretations,
the questions comprising the brokenness battery are intentionally broad and encompassing.11
Response options were all re-coded to range from zero to one, with greater values on
the dependent variables corresponding to greater legitimacy. To evaluate the hypotheses,
the legitimacy batteries were modeled on the above predictors using a standard linear OLS
model.The model included a variety of control variables shown to influence legitimacy, such
as age, race, commitment to democratic values12 , Court-specific knowledge (identify the
current Chief Justice and how many justices sit on the Court), and ideology. The full
question wording can be found in the supplementary materials.

3.2.1

Results

Abridged results are presented graphically in Figure 3.1, with the full regression model
presented in Figure B.1 and Table B.2, respectively, in the supplementary materials.
First, some descriptive information. The distribution of both legitimacy measures is
presented in Figure 3.2 and shows that the mean level of felt obligation toward the Court is
higher than peoples’ willingness to resist reform. The obligation measure also appears to be
skewed, with more respondents on the upper-end of the distribution than the lower end.
Figure 3.3 shows the partisan breakdown of each legitimacy measure. Consistent with
the theory to this point, Democratic respondents express less willingness to resist reforms
than Republican respondents, however the obligation felt toward the Court is similar among
11
In future work, I hope to conduct cognitive interviewing to see what “brokenness” means to different
groups of people. This important insight was not possible in this dissertation due to resource constraints.
12
Using an ungodly 15-question battery
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Correlates of Supreme Court Legitimacy
By Conceptualization
Concern for Future
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Source: Lucid Study, Sept. 2020. N=817.

Figure 3.1: Figure showing the output of an ordinary least squares regression on both legitimacy and institutional support (traditional and as support for Court curbing). Data
are from the September 2020 Lucid Attitudes Study and are weighted to known population
parameters.

64

Legitimacy Afforded to the Supreme Court
by Various Conceptualizations
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Source: Lucid Study, March 2020. N=1,040.

Figure 3.2: Descriptive statistics showing how the two measures of legitimacy relate to each
other among all respondents.
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Legitimacy Afforded to the Supreme Court
by Legitimacy Measure

Republican

Democrat

Concept
Resisting Reform
Feeling Obligated
0

.2

.4

.6

.8

1

Source: Lucid Study, March 2020. N=1,040.

Figure 3.3: Descriptive statistics showing the partisan breakdown of each legitimacy measure.
both Democratic and Republican respondents. The overall pattern that obligation felt is
greater than institutional support is similar when looking at these two groups, as well.
Turning to the analysis, the results of the observational analysis widely support the
hypotheses. Specifically, as perceptions that the Court is hostile increase, a willingness to
defend the Court from alterations decreases, which is similar for a perception that the Court
is broken as expected from Hypotheses 1 and 4. This is true for both of the institutional
support measures. Further, consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 5, obligation felt toward the
Court remains unchanged.
When it comes to the interaction effect predicted in Hypothesis 3, the results might or
might not support the theory depending on which institutional support battery one prefers
and how one views p-values. Specifically, Figure 3.4 shows the interaction between how
obligated people feel toward the Court and how concerned people are about the future of
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Felt Obligation Moderates Effects of Concern for Future Decisions
on Institutional Support for the Supreme Court
Future of Gay Marriage
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Source: Lucid Study, Sept. 2020. Dependent variable is traditional legitimacy index.

Figure 3.4: Interaction effects between worry of what the Court will do in the future and
obligation felt toward the Court on the traditional institutional support measure of legitimacy.
a variety of rights on the traditional legitimacy battery. The only interaction that reaches
traditional levels of significance is a concern for the future of free speech. A concern about
Second Amendment rights is marginally insignificant (p = 0.066) while the other two are
insignificant.
However, when replacing the traditional battery of questions with an index of responses
to the specific Court-curbing questions as in Figure 3.5, we get significant results across the
board with one exception. The abortion interaction is a p-value of 0.07.13 Importantly,
this applied battery is similar to that advocated by Badas (2019) who argues that the
traditional measure underestimates the extent to which the public holds the Supreme Court
accountable. If this is true, then the results in Figure 3.5 are more in line with how the
13

Close enough.
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public would respond to the Court. As a result, I am calling this a win for the theory.14
Although we should be cautious when interpreting the control variables15 included in
the model, they offer some interesting insights into the correlates of obligation felt toward
the Court and how these predictors correspond to known predictors of the institutional
support battery. First, consistent with mountains of existing literature, institutional support
is positively correlated with democratic values, age, and knowledge about the Court. In
contrast to existing literature, being Black does not reach statistical significance in this
sample but does trend in the direction which is consistent with existing scholarship that
Black Americans exhibit less legitimacy for the Court than whites (Gibson and Caldeira,
1992; Gibson and Nelson, 2018). Unfortunately, the small number of Black respondents does
not allow much analysis of this important subpopulation.
When it comes to obligation felt toward the Court, the results point to both similarities
and key differences between this measure and institutional support. First, similar to existing
literature, legitimacy is correlated strongly with age and knowledge of the Court. Indeed, the
relationship between age and legitimacy appears stronger than between age and institutional
support. Democratic values, on the other hand, do not correlate with legitimacy. The effects
of subjective ideological disagreement seem similar between the two measures: that is, the
greater the difference between reported self-ideology and perceived Court ideology, the less
institutional support is afforded to the Court and the less people report feeling obligated.
This is an important area for future scholarship.
14
15

Hello motivated reasoning, thy name is Nathan.
I actually think you’re not supposed to do this, but not completely sure.
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Felt Obligation Moderates Effects of Concern for Future Decisions
on Institutional Support for the Supreme Court
Future of Gay Marriage
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Source: Lucid Study, Sept. 2020. Dependent variable is applied legitimacy index.

Figure 3.5: Interaction effects between worry of what the Court will do in the future and
obligation felt toward the Court on measure of legitimacy consisting of specific reform questions.
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How Different Measurements of Supreme Court Legitimacy
Relate to Support for Reform

Institutional Support
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Source: Lucid Study, Sept. 2020. N=898.

Figure 3.6: Correlates between support for specific reform attempts, institutional support,
and felt obligation.

3.3

Felt Obligation and Support for Reform

Next, to investigate Hypothesis 6 and evaluate the relationship between felt obligation and
support for concrete efforts at reform, each of the questions that comprise the applied legitimacy (Court-curbing) battery was individually modeled on both the traditional institutional
support battery and the new felt obligation battery. The results are presented in Figure 3.6
Unsurprisingly and in a testament to its external validity, the traditional institutional
support battery does a phenomenal job correlating (negatively!) with support for the polled
reforms. For Hypothesis 6, however, the results are not supportive: felt obligation is only
positively related to some of the reforms while being uncorrelated with others.16 Even
16

The single negative correlation involves a question asking about a bipartisan citizen panel to overturn
Supreme Court decisions. This is a poorly-designed and unrealistic reform and is abandoned in future studies.
In its place, future studies ask about Congress having the authority to overturn Supreme Court decisions.
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though the results here do not support Hypothesis 6, the fact that only one (unrealistic)
measure is negatively correlated with felt obligation and the rest are uncorrelated nevertheless
lends support to the broader argument of the dissertation that supporting reform does not
undermine the Court’s place in the constitutional order by reducing the obligation felt toward
the institution.

3.4

Discussion

Consistent with the theory that people can afford and withhold support for an institution
independent of legitimacy, this chapter introduces two new considerations to the calculus
that have not previously been explored in the literature: concern that the institution is
broken and a belief that the Court is hostile to group interests. These factors are important
because they are ubiquitous in the information environment surrounding the Court. Elites in
both parties often signal to their co-partisans about what the Court might do in the future,
and news headlines occasionally signal that the Court is broken or in need of fixing. Even
so, we know surprisingly little about how these messages affect support for the Court. As
clear here, these signals do matter for the extent to which the public is willing to defend
the Court from alterations. But, the upshot is that they do not seem to affect the extent to
which people feel obligated to the Court.
Moreover, these new considerations underscore important differences between the measures of legitimacy while simultaneously highlighting the perils of equating legitimacy with
institutional support. First, concern with what the Court will do in the future is negatively
correlated with institutional support (both using the traditional measures and the applied
index) but is unrelated to felt obligation. Similarly, worry that the Court is on the verge
of becoming obsolete is associated with a reduction in institutional support but, likewise, is
unrelated to the obligation felt toward the Court. Finally, support for concrete efforts at
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reform is mostly uncorrelated with obligation felt.
Taken together, these findings should offer some solace to those concerned that efforts at
reform automatically signal that the Court is in danger of losing its place in the Constitutional order. Just because people are willing to tolerate or even support institutional reform,
they do not automatically lose the obligation that they feel to the Court. And, as I argue in
Chapters 1 and 2, it is this internalized feeling of obligation, not institutional support, which
allows the Court to function normatively and institutionally. Consequently, a Court without
institutional support can still protect the rights of minorities from overzealous majorities
even though the public is willing to change the makeup of the institution.
Even so, the cross-sectional nature of the data presented here means that it is impossible
to determine causality and the direction of the relationship. Moreover, although all attempts
have been made to include relevant predictors in the models, omitted variables likely exist.
Consequently, the next chapter supplements the observational data presented here with
experimental data in an attempt to triangulate around the overall theory of the dissertation.
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Chapter 4
Experiments Manipulating Perceived
Court Hostility and Brokenness
The previous chapter offered observational evidence to support several of the expectations
outlined in Chapter 1. Specifically, people’s willingness to defend the Supreme Court from
changes seems to be impacted by a worry about what the Court will do in the future and a
belief that the Court is broken, but neither seem to correlate with how obligated a person feels
toward the institution. Likewise, concrete efforts at reform (such as term limits, mandatory
retirement ages, and the like), are not negatively correlated with felt obligation, and some
are positively correlated in line with expectations.
Even so, several shortcomings of the observational data persists. Primarily, issues with
endogeneity and the direction of the relationship. Because of the cross-sectional nature
of the data in Chapter 3, it is not possible to determine causality or the direction of any
relationship. Additionally, there is the very real change of omitted variables that would
otherwise impact the observed relationship, both in terms of its direction and magnitude.
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to triangulate around the theory by supplement-
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ing the observational data with experimental data. Specifically, I present the results from
two original experiments conducted via online surveying platforms. The first experiment is
complex and uses a blocking mechanism to manipulate both a worry of future decisions and
a concern that the Court is broken. The second experiment is a standard between-subjects
design seeking to manipulate only the belief that the Court is broken. The results offer mixed
support for the observational results in the previous chapter and the overarching theory.

4.1

Experiment 1: Preregistered Lucid Study

Experiment number one was conducted on the Lucid Theorem platform much like the observational results presented in Chapter 3. Because Lucid is discussed at length in the
previous chapter, I will only remind readers that it offers a non-probability based sample of
respondents that have been quota sampled to match U.S. Census demographic benchmarks
(Coppock and McClellan, 2019). Unlike the previous chapter which presents weighted observational data, however, the data presented here are unweighted since weighting experimental
data risks introducing bias (Miratrix et al., 2018). This project was preregistered on AsPredicted during data collection (#82551), and the full preregistration plan can be found in the
supplementary material (see, Figure C.1).
As noted in the introduction, the Lucid experiment is a complex between-subjects design
using blocking on partisan identity to manipulate perceptions that the Court is hostile to
policy goals and that it is broken. After consenting to participate in the study, respondents
were immediately asked their partisanship using the traditional two-step ANES procedure.
Next, respondents were randomly assigned (behind the scenes) into one of three study waves:
control, concern, and broken, with the latter two manipulating concern about future decisions
and a belief that the Court is broken, respectively. After being randomized (but before any
treatment), respondents were presented with an attention check and those who fail the check
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were removed. In total, 776 respondents successfully participated in the study, producing
250 in the control wave, 269 in the concern wave, and 257 in the broken wave.

4.1.1

Outcomes of Interest

After being treated (if applicable), respondents in all of the waves were asked the three batteries of questions that should be familiar by this point: the traditional institutional support
battery (Gibson, 2011), a battery measuring concrete reform efforts (Badas, 2019), and the
battery of questions designed and validated in Chapter 2. The first two batteries measure
institutional support in two separate ways. The third battery is designed to measure how obligated respondents feel toward the Court and its demands. The scale reliability coefficients
for the traditional diffuse support, applied legitimacy, and the felt obligation batteries are is
.74, .84, and .85, respectively. The dependent variable batteries were presented in random
order, and the questions within each battery were presented randomly, as well. Respondents
were also asked a series of questions designed to gauge their perceptions of the Court’s ideology, as well as how much they know about the Supreme Court. The study concluded with
a series of demographic questions and a debriefing for those in the “concern” wave.

4.1.2

Manipulation: A Broken Court

Respondents randomized into the “broken” wave, and who passed the attention check, were
exposed to a treatment consisting of a series of recent headlines noting that the Supreme
Court is broken or in need of being fixed. The treatment for the “broken” wave is shown in
Figure 4.1. Respondents were allowed to progress in the survey only after five seconds had
elapsed.
These treatments were chosen with an eye toward maximizing external validity. Each of
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Figure 4.1: Manipulation for Experiment 1: Broken wave, which consists of a variety of
real-life headlines signaling that the Supreme Court is broken or in need of being fixed.
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these headlines has appeared in a reputable news source at one point or another, meaning that
study participants are exposed to a treatment that exists outside of the experimental context.
Such an approach has the added benefit of reducing the deception necessary in the study.
However, it must be acknowledged that, for theory testing purposes, the treatments are less
than perfect, and future studies should use artificial headlines that have been successfully
pretested.

4.1.3

Results: Broken Court

The first step in analyzing the treatment effects is to ensure that the treatment successfully
manipulated perceptions that the Supreme Court was broken. As a manipulation check,
respondents in both the control wave and the treated wave were asked “How much do you
agree with the following statement: the Supreme Court is broken?” Responses were transformed such that values closer to 1 indicated greater support for the statement. Regressing
the manipulation check on the treatment indicator returns a p-value of p = 0.069, which is
confirmed with a two-tailed t-test (mean of .56 in the control group and .60 in the treated
group). Although this does not meet the traditional statistical threshold of p < .05, it is
close enough.1
Now that the manipulation has been verified, we can progress to the main analysis: did
manipulating the belief that the Court is broken affect support for the Court? More importantly, did it affect respondents’ willingness to defend the Court but not how obligated they
feel (as the theory predicts)? Not quite, as indicated in Figure 4.2.The average treatment
effects across all of the conditions is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that
none of the batteries are influenced by manipulating perceptions that the Court is broken.
The full regression output can be found in Table C.1 in the appendix.
1

Accepting this p-value is a departure from the preregistration plan, which says, “The null hypotheses
will be rejected using the traditional cutoff for significance of p < .05.”
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Experiment 1: Average Treatment Effects of Broken Wave
Compared to Control Condition, By Legitimacy Measure

Treated

Diffuse Support
Court Curbing
Felt Obligation
-.25

-.20

-.15

-.10

-.05

0

.05

.10

.15

.20

.25

Source: Lucid Experiment, December, 2021. N=495.

Figure 4.2: Average treatment effects of the ‘broken’ wave showing null effects across legitimacy measures when compared to the pure control condition.
To further explore the relationship, I regressed each battery directly on the manipulation
check (consistent with the preregistration plan [see question 8]). The results are presented
in Figure 4.3. Consistent with the observational data in the previous chapter, these results
show a strong correlation between a belief that the Court is broken and the institutional
support batteries. Unlike the observational data, however, obligation felt toward the Court
is also correlated, though to a lesser degree. Full regression model can be found in Table C.2
in the appendix.

4.1.4

Manipulation: A Hostile Court

The previous section lends little support to the idea that manipulating belief that the
Supreme Court is broken affects legitimacy of the Court. This section investigates the
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Experiment 1: Direct Effects of Manipulation Check
By Legitimacy Measure
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Source: Lucid Experiment, December, 2021. N=495.

Figure 4.3: Effects of modeling the ‘broken court’ manipulation check question directly on
the legitimacy measures.
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second manipulation: that the Court is hostile to in-group interests.
Those who passed the attention check and who were randomly assigned to the “concern”
wave were subsequently blocked based on their political partisanship and treated on the
basis of their co-party affiliation. Specifically, Republicans (both strong and lean) were
exposed to a treatment indicating that “top Repuublicans” expressed concern about how
the Supreme Court will harm GOP party goals in the future and how these concerns were
echoed by former-President Donald Trump. Conversely, those who identified as strong or lean
Democrats were exposed to the same treatment, but with President Biden expressing worry
about how the Court will harm Democratic Party goals.2 The treatments are presented below
in Figure 4.4. After being treated, respondents were asked a manipulation check question
and then progressed to the dependent variables. The comparison group are respondents
randomized into the “control” wave.

4.1.5

Results: Hostile Court (GOP)

Before continuing, an important note about the study design: because of a coding error on
the back-end of Qualtrics in the survey flow, the Democratic blocking was unsuccessful.To
be more precise, an “and” instead of an “or” on the display logic means that no Democrats
were treated. Unfortunately, (expensive) mistakes happen, and this is one of those times.
Republicans, on the other hand, appear to be successfully treated, as shown in the
manipulation check. Respondents were asked, “How much do you agree with the following
statement: ‘In the future, the Supreme Court is likely to strike down Republican Party
goals?”’ As with the previous section, this variable was transformed such that values closer
to one (1) indicate stronger agreement with the statement. The mean of GOP respondents
in the treatment condition (N=93) is .58 with a mean of .44 among all respondents in the
2

Respondents randomized into the “concern” wave, passed the attention check, but who identify as a
pure independent were booted from the study.
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Figure 4.4: Manipulations for Experiment 1: Concern wave.
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Experiment 1: Average Treatment Effects of Hostile Court Manipulation
Comparing Treated GOP Respondents to Control Condition, By Legitimacy Measure
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Figure 4.5: Comparing Republican respondents in the ‘hostile Court’ wave to those in the
control condition showing null results across legitimacy measures.
control condition (N=246). Compared to Republicans in the control condition, the treatment
increases perceptions that the Court is hostile by 8%. The full regression model can be found
in Table C.3 in the appendix.
Average treatment effects for the concern wave among the GOP are shown in Figure 4.5.
None of the models reach conventional levels of statistical significance. When regressing the
dependent variables on the manipulation check, however, a significant negative relationship
exists such that greater belief that the Court is hostile is correlated with a reduced willingness
to support the Court, but felt obligation is uncorrelated. This is shown in Figure 4.6. This is
an interesting finding and does lend support to the argument that institutional support can
vary while obligation felt toward the Court remains. Nevertheless, this finding is not borne
out in the analysis of the average treatment effects shown above and is worthy of further
scrutiny.
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Experiment 1: Direct Effects of GOP Hostile Manipulation
By Legitimacy Measure
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Figure 4.6: Effects of modeling the ‘hostile court’ manipulation check question directly on
the legitimacy measures.
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Mediation and Sensitivity Analysis

Next, I conducted a mediation and sensitivity analysis. Mediation analysis is a way to see
how much of the effects of a treatment travel through a particular identified mechanism
under a few sets of limited assumptions. For any given treatment, there are a plethora of
pathways (observed and not) through which it might influence outcomes of interest. For
example, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto (2015) focus on the Perry Preschool Project (PPP),
a famous randomized experiment manipulating pre-k attendance. Numerous studies using
the PPP data show that pre-k exposure has important downstream consequences for everything from higher lifetime earnings, incarceration rates, and, importantly for the present
purposes, high school graduation rates. Though studies show that the treatment (going
to pre-k) has a positive influence on the outcome (graduating high school), more sophisticated statistical techniques are needed to discover why this relationship exists. It could be
that attending pre-k enhances emotional maturity or results in greater friendship networks.
Maybe pre-k enhances cognitive ability. The question of why pre-k affects graduation rates
is where mediation analysis is helpful: by breaking down the average treatment effects into
direct and indirect components, we can peek into the black box of causal interpretation. As
Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto (2015, 938) underscores, “...the indirect effect reflects one
possible explanation for why the treatment works, and the direct effects all other possible
explanations.”3
To conduct the mediation analysis under sequential ignoraibility assumptions4 , I used
the mediation package in Stata (Hicks and Tingley, 2011). The results are presented in the
Table 4.1 along with 95% confidence intervals. ATE refers to the average treatment effects.
ACME is the “average causal mediated effects” and refers to the portion of the average total
effects that is transmitted through the manipulation check question asking respondents how
3

Why conduct a mediation analysis when the average treatment effect is zero? Imai, Keele and Tingley
(2010, 312) note that even when the average treatment effects are zero, there is the potential for various
mechanisms to offset each other.
4
More on this below
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ACME
ADE
ATE
% of ATE Mediated
ACME
ADE
ATE
% of ATE Mediated
ACME
ADE
ATE
% of ATE Mediated

Traditional Battery
-0.02
0.07
0.05
-0.29
Court Curbing
-0.02
0.13
0.11
-0.16
Felt Obligation
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.37

95% C.I.
-0.03 to -0.004
0.02 to 0.12
0.01 to 0.10
-1.50 to -0.14
95% C.I.
-0.03 to -0.00
0.07 to 0.18
0.05 to 0.17
-0.32 to -0.11
95% C.I.
0.00 to 0.03
-0.04 to 0.06
-0.03 to 0.07
-4.70 to 4.79

Table 4.1: Results from mediation analysis conducted on the “hostile court” manipulation
of the Lucid experiment.

hostile they perceive the Court to be. ADE (average direct effects) refers to everything else
within the ATE that is not being transmitted through the mediator (Keele, Tingley and
Yamamoto, 2015, 952).
Although not shown from the standard model regression above (presented in Figure 4.5,
the total effects (ATE) produced in the mediation analysis show that the treatment had a
significant effect on both institutional support measures, increasing support for the Court
by 5% for the traditional battery and 11% for the Court curbing measure. The ATE for
felt obligation, however, is not significantly affected by the treatment. For the traditional
legitimacy battery, the ACME is -0.02, meaning that treatment-induced changes in perceived
hostility by the Court accounts for about 2% of the total effect (in the opposite direction),
which is similar for the Court curbing battery. For the felt obligation battery, the effect is
estimated to be 1%.
To this point, the analysis has assumed that there are no unmeasured confounding variables that influence both the mediator and the outcome variable (the sequential ignorability
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assumption that was referenced earlier). Even in the context of a randomized experiment,
this assumption is not guaranteed. To return to the pre-k study mentioned earlier, one potential confounding variable is depression, which could influence both cognitive ability and
graduation rates, irrespective of treatment condition (Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto, 2015,
953). In our current context, a plethora of (both known and unknown) factors influence
the relationship between perceived hostility and legitimacy but be unrelated to treatment
assignment (since it is random). For example, emotions like anxiety or anger, identities like
race and partisanship, just to name a few, could conceivably relate to a belief that the Court
is hostile and legitimacy afforded to the Court.
To see the extent to which the results of the mediation analysis are dependent upon this
(unprovable) assumption, a sensitivity analysis is required. The sensitivity analysis uses the
correlation between the error terms in the mediation and outcome models. If the sequential
ignorability assumption holds, the correlation between the terms should be zero.5 The results
are graphically presented in Figure 4.7. These figures depict the correlation between the error
terms in the mediator and outcome regression models, ρ, against the true ACME.
For the traditional battery, the ACME will be equal to zero when ρ is equal to -0.14.
This value is -0.13 for the court curbing battery, and 0.09 for the felt obligation battery.
The sensitivity analysis indicates that both institutional support batteries are more robust
to unobserved pretreatment confounders than is the felt obligation battery.

4.1.6

Summary of Findings

The results of the Lucid experiment decidedly do not support the argument that institutional support can vary while leaving obligation felt toward the institution untouched. First,
increasing the belief that the Supreme Court is broken does not affect institutional support
5

Don’t ask me what this means. It’s what is said in Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto (2015, 953).
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Traditional Battery ACME(ρ)
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Figure 4.7: Results of the sensitivity analysis for all three dependent variable batteries.
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(measured as both the traditional and applied legitimacy/court curbing batteries), nor does
it affect how obligated people feel toward the institution (demonstrated in Figure 4.2). When
modeling perceived brokenness of the Court on the batteries, however, they are all negatively
correlated, albeit felt obligation is less correlated than the others (see Figure 4.3. When it
comes to a Court perceived to be hostile to partisan interests, however, average treatment
effects similarly zero: there are no effects on legitimacy when manipulating the belief that
the Court is hostile (at least among Republicans). However, when directly regressing the
mechanism on the batteries, a similar story to that above emerges: all are negatively correlated, though obligation felt is correlated to a lesser degree. Finally, a mediation analysis
shows that, to the extent that the identified mechanism (a perception that the Court is broken) affected the underlying dependent variables, it did so more for the institutional support
batteries than the felt obligation battery. But, upon closer inspection with a sensitivity analysis, the ACME for the felt obligation battery is less robust to violations of the sequential
ignorability assumption than the institutional support batteries. More data are needed to
further investigate the mediation effects.

4.2

Experiment 2: CloudResearch

Because of the weird6 findings of experiment 1, the improperly specified Qualtrics survey
flow resulting in the failure of Democrats to be treated, and in light of some concerns about
Lucid survey quality in 2021 (Peyton, Huber and Coppock, 2020), a second experiment was
conducted on a separate platform. This second study, conducted on CloudResearch (formerly
known as TurkPrime), offers an alternative sample on which to compare the results of the
Lucid experiment. Past experience has also suggested that attentiveness is greater on MTurk
than on Lucid.
6

A totally valid scientific term.
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The second experiment, fielded in March of 2022, sought to manipulate a belief that the
Court is broken using a standard between-subjects design. After consenting to participate
and finishing the first part of the study7 , respondents were informed that the survey would
switch gears and ask about American political institutions for the remainder of the study.
After continuing in the study, respondents were asked their attitudes toward Judge Ketanji
Brown Jackson who had been nominated by President Biden to the Supreme Court a couple
weeks earlier. Respondents were asked: “You might have heard that President Biden has
nominated Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson to the U.S. Supreme Court. How closely have
you been following the news about Judge Jackson’s nomination?” and “How much do you
support Judge Jackson’s nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court?”
Next, participants were randomized into a treated or control condition, with those treated
being exposed to similar news headlines as in the Lucid Experiment. However, one of the
headlines was replaced that said the Supreme Court was “not well” and was replaced with a
New York Times headline saying “How To Fix the Supreme Court.” The reason for swapping
out this headline is because the original headline mentioned an ideologically-charged issue
(guns) which could affect the treatment effect, especially when combined with the other
treatments. Like in the first experiment, all of the headlines on the treatment are real, which
eliminates the need for deception in the experiment and adds to the external validity of the
study. The treatment is presented below in Figure 4.8. Similar to the Lucid experiment,
respondents in the control condition were not exposed to any treatment and progressed
straight to the dependent variables. Both the treated and control conditions were asked the
same manipulation check used in the earlier Lucid Experiment.
Because of the limited real estate in the study, abridged versions of the dependent variable
batteries was used. For the traditional battery, respondents were asked how much they agree
with the statements: “If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most
7

This study was appended to an unrelated study which sought to evaluate the role of empathy in politics.
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Figure 4.8: Manipulation for Experiment 2 consisting of a variety of real-life headlines signaling that the U.S. Supreme Court needs to be saved or fixed.
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people disagree with, it might be better to do away with the Supreme Court altogether,”
“The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be
reduced,” and “The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.” To measure court
curbing attitudes, respondents were asked: “Do you support or oppose plans to add justices
to the U.S. Supreme Court?” “Do you support or oppose plans to term limit Supreme
Court justices to a single 18-year term?” and “Do you support or oppose plans to require
justices to retire after they reach a certain age?” To measure felt obligation toward the
Court, respondents were asked their agreement with the statements: “Even if a majority of
citizens disagree with its decisions, people should still comply with decisions issued by the
United States Supreme Court;” “Decisions by the United States Supreme Court should be
considered final and authoritative;” and “People should obey the Supreme Court even if it
goes against what they think is right.” While using abridged versions of the batteries is
not the best case scenario, it is consistent with other research investigating Supreme Court
legitimacy in studies with limited space (Armaly and Lane, 2022). In total, 520 respondents
participated in the study: 261 in the control condition and 259 in the treated condition.

4.2.1

Results of CloudResearch Experiment

All dependent variables were transformed to range from zero to one with higher values
indicating greater legitimacy for the Court. First, similar to in the observational results in
Chapter 2, a confirmatory principal-component factor analysis was conducted by including
all of the questions comprising the traditional battery and felt obligation battery in the same
model to investigate their loadings and latent structure. The PCA returns two factors with
loadings suggestive of expectations. A varimax rotation further indicates the presence of two
distinct factors, with each question loading decidedly into their respective latent factor.8
8

This same result obtains even when restricting the PCA to only those (untreated) respondents in the
control condition.
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Next, to what extent was the treatment successful in manipulating perceptions that the
Supreme Court is broken? The treatment was very successful in its mission, although it
moved respondents in the opposite direction than expected. Specifically, mean belief that
the Supreme Court is broken among those in the control condition is .63, whereas it is .55
in the treated condition (t = 3.95; p < .0001).
This finding is odd and suggests the potential for heterogeneous treatment effects. For
fun, I investigated this possibility by running two regressions of the manipulation check on
the treatment indicator, but restricting each regression to those who identify as either a
Republican or Democrat. The findings support the idea of heterogeneous treatment effects:
although strong or weak Republicans are affected by the treatment (t = −1.98), Democrats
are unaffected (t = −1.43). However, when independents who lean toward Republicans
or Democrats are included in the model, heterogeneous effects are no longer present: the
treatment is successful for both Republicans (t = −2.68) and Democrats (t = −2.79).
To summarize, heterogeneous effects exist among partisan identifiers, but not when leaners are included. Because of the heterogeneous treatment effects based on self identity, the
results that follow are presented in two steps: first, the average treatment effect is reported,
and then the same models are re-run restricted to only those who identify as Republican
(with leaners excluded).
Figure 4.9 reports the average treatment effects regressing the indexed dependent variable
batteries on the treatment indicator and indicate that both institutional support measures
are influenced by the treatment in a positive direction. In contrast to theory, however, felt
obligation is also positively affected by the treatment (t = 1.82; p = 0.07). Substantively
similar results obtain when re-running the model with the factored dependent variables in
place of the indexed variables: increasing a perception that the Supreme Court is broken results in increased legitimacy toward the Court measured as both obligation and institutional
support. Full regression output can be found in Table C.4 in the appendix.
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Experiment 2: Average Treatment Effects
Compared to Control Condition, by Legitimacy Measure

Treated

Diffuse Support
Court Curbing
Felt Obligation
-.25
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.05

.10

.15

.20

.25

Source: CloudResearch Experiment, March, 2022. N=673.

Figure 4.9: Average treatment effects showing a significant increase in legitimacy compared
to respondents in the control condition across all measures.
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ACME
ADE
ATE
% of ATE Mediated
ACME
ADE
ATE
% of ATE Mediated
ACME
ADE
ATE
% of ATE Mediated

Traditional Battery
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.70
Court Curbing
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.62
Felt Obligation
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.37

95% C.I.
0.02 to 0.05
-0.01 to 0.04
0.01 to 0.08
0.39 to 2.78
95% C.I.
0.01 to 0.04
-0.01 to 0.04
0.01 to 0.08
0.34 to 2.46
95% C.I.
0.01 to 0.03
-0.01 to 0.06
0.01 to 0.08
0.21 to 1.32

Table 4.2: Results from mediation analysis conducted on CloudResearch study.

4.2.2

CloudResearch Mediation and Sensitivity Analysis

Similar to the Lucid experiment, I conducted a mediation analysis to investigate the percentage of the total effects that are mediated through the measured mechanism. In other
words, how much of the average treatment effect is the result of me tinkering with how broken people perceive the Court and how much travels through other (unidentified) pathways?
The results are displayed in Table 4.2.
The results of the mediation analysis show that 70%, 62%, and 37% of the ACME on the
traditional, curbing, and obligation batteries respectively is mediated through the mechanism
measured. This finding suggests that a belief that the Court is broken is less related to the
obligation felt than to a willingness to defend the Court from alterations, although both are
still moderately related.
To evaluate how robust the findings of the mediation analysis are to violations of the
sequential ignorability assumption, the results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in
Figure 4.10. Unlike with the Lucid survey (which had null average treatment effects), the
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findings here are moderately robust to violations of the sequential ignorability assumption.
For the ACME to be zero, the ρ must be 0.46 for the traditional battery, 0.40 for the court
curbing battery, and 0.25 for the obligation battery.

Heterogeneous Effect Analysis

To see the effects of Democratic-identifiers not responding to the treatment (as discussed
previously), each legitimacy battery was regressed on an interaction of the treatment indicator and partisanship. Figure 4.11 presents the predicted legitimacy of the Supreme Court
for each of the legitimacy batteries.
As a reminder, the court curbing variable is coded such that greater values indicate
opposition to Court curbing.9 In other words, all three dependent variables are coded such
that greater values correspond to more legitimacy for the institution.
Across all three measures, Democrats are decidedly less supportive of the Court, though
they do not report feeling significantly less obligated toward the Court. When it comes to
heterogeneous treatment effects, Republicans become less willing to support Court curbing
when treated whereas Democrats remain steadfast in their support for curbing the Court.
Finally, Democrats appear to respond more to the treatment in the traditional support
measure, though marginally. Full model outputs can be found in Table C.5 in the appendix.
9

You might be thinking: “that’s dumb,” to which I respond, “I agree.” But, it helps in interpretation
to have this variable consistent with the others in terms of direction. I am open to other phrases beyond
“Court curbing” that do not refer back to the traditional battery. Badas (2019) terms these questions the
“applied legitimacy index,” but I find “Court curbing” to be more intuitive in what is being measured.
Would welcome thoughts here, though.
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Figure 4.10: Results of the sensitivity analysis conducted on the CloudResearch experiment.
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Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
by Legitimacy Conceptualization
Court Curbing Opposition

Predicted Support

Predicted Support

Institutional Support
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.5
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Partisanship
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Partisanship

Predicted Obligation

Felt Obligation
.75
.7
.65
.6

Control
Treated

.55
Strong Democrat

Strong Republican

Partisanship
Source: CloudResearch Study, March. 2020.

Figure 4.11: Predicted values for the interaction between partisanship and treatment, by
legitimacy conceptualization. Leaners excluded.
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4.3

Conclusion

This chapter has presented a trove of information and data, very little of which supports
the theory outlined at the outset. To recount and summarize: the (preregistered) Lucid
experiment attempted to manipulate both the belief that the Court was hostile to partisan
goals and belief that it was broken. To do the former, the experiment used a blocking
technique to expose respondents to in-party signals expressing worry of what the Court will
do in the future. For the latter, respondents were exposed to news stories about how the
Court is broken.
The results of the Lucid experiment offer limited support for the theory in Chapter 1
and supported with observational data in Chapter 3. The preregistered analysis returned
null effects on all three legitimacy batteries for those treated to news stories on how the
Court is broken. Due to a mistake in the blocking, only Republicans were treated with
the “hostile Court” treatment, but the results among GOP respondents do not support the
theory. However, when directly modeling the mechanism on the dependent variable (instead
of a treatment indicator), both institutional support measures are significantly related while
felt obligation is uncorrelated.
Experiment 2 sought to further scrutinize the findings of the Lucid Study on a new sample
of respondents that, historically, has provided higher data quality. Specifically, Experiment
2 was conducted using CloudResearch instead of Lucid and only sought to manipulate belief
that the Supreme Court was broken. As a result, the study design was much simpler. While
results show that the experiment was successful in manipulating the perception that the
Court was broken, it did so in the opposite direction than expected. Specifically, those
exposed to the treatment became less supportive of the statement: “The U.S. Supreme
Court is broken.” Even with this hiccup, however, the results do not offer support for the
theory: all three outcome variables increased among those who were treated.
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4.3.1

What Explains the Findings?

Not only do the results of the second experiment not match the results of the first experiment,
but the results of the experimental data offered here do not substantiate the results of the
observational analysis presented in the last chapter. This section theorizes why this might
be the case on both dimensions.
When comparing the second experiment to the first, several differences stand out that
could potentially explain the diverging results. While the Lucid experiment shows null results
on the hostility treatment across the dependent variables, the CloudResearch study shows
significant results among all three batteries. Why?
One potential explanation is the attentiveness of the samples, with CloudResearch offering higher quality data than Lucid. This is not uncommon. Around the time that the
Lucid experiment was fielded, concern was being raised about a decline in the attentiveness
of respondents on the Lucid Theorem platform. In other words, although the attentiveness
of Lucid respondents was thought at one time to be acceptable (Coppock and McClellan,
2019), respondent quality began to decline, especially surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic
(Peyton, Huber and Coppock, 2020). An attention check was included in the experiment to
attempt to remove inattentive respondents, but these are not always successful at weeding
out inattentive respondents and might even introduce systematic bias.10 While respondent
attentiveness on Lucid is currently being debated in the literature, researchers generally
agree about the high-level of attentiveness paid by MTurk workers to their tasks.Because
CloudResearch uses workers from MTurk—and because the study was limited to only those
respondents who were approved to do CloudResearch tasks—it suggests that the results of
the CloudResearch study are more valid and reliable.
Another potential explanation for the incongruent findings across experiments is that the
10

I saw a recent paper about this on Twitter but I’ve looked high and low and cannot find it anywhere.
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CloudResearch experiment used three questions for each battery instead of the full batteries
used in the Lucid experiment. If this modification explains the inconsistent results, then
re-running the Lucid experiment limited to only those questions used in the CloudResearch
study should produce similar results. The results of the reanalysis confirm the results obtained using the full batteries: there are no significant differences among those randomized
into the “broken” wave compared to those randomized into the “treatment” wave.
Finally, the treatments across the studies were not perfectly identical. Although both
studies sought to manipulate a perception that the Supreme Court is broken, the treatment
was modified after the Lucid study by swapping out one of the more questionable headlines.
Moreover, the directions of the manipulations is inconsistent. Although the manipulation in
the Lucid study does not reach conventional measures of statistical significance (but is close
enough), it nevertheless appears to increase the belief that the Court is broken. Conversely,
the CloudResearch treatment decreases the belief that the Court is broken.
Why might the experimental results differ from the observational results? First, the
observational results suffer from omitted variable bias and other concerns with endogeneity.
Also, although the observational data are weighted, they derive from a nonprobability-based
sample.
Future experimental research would benefit from validating each of the headlines used
in the experiments through pretesting. Additionally, the results of these studies should be
replicated on a probability-based sample. For the “hostile” treatment, scholars should investigate if hostility toward other non-partisan identities matter for legitimacy. For example,
if the Court is perceived to be hostile to your gender, sexual orientation, or race, might
that matter, even when partisanship does not.11 Future observational research should be
conducted on a probability sample.
11
I acknowledge this is unlikely given how interconnected each of these identities have become with political
partisanship (Mason, 2018). Nevertheless, it should be explored.
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What do the results to this point mean for the theory? One way of thinking about the
results is that they offer no support for the theory and, consequently, the theory should be
rejected. However, because two experiments are producing two different findings, I believe
a better interpretation to be that they are inconclusive and that additional data collection
is needed to evaluate the theory. Future studies should investigate additional observable
implications of the theory and seek to test them with pretested, validated treatments on
better samples of respondents.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either
the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength
or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even
for the efficacy of its judgments. This simple view of the
matter suggests several important consequences. It proves
incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the
weakest of the three departments of power; that it can
never attack with success either of the other two; and that
all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself
against their attacks.
Hamilton, Federalist 78

Over two centuries ago, Alexander Hamilton, in his characteristically arrogant way1 ,
assured the young nation that the Supreme Court would “...always be the least dangerous
to the political rights of the Constitution.” To Hamilton, this “incontestible” and “simple
view of the matter” was based on the assurances that the Court possesses “neither force
nor will, but merely judgement.” While the executive branch controlled the military, and
the legislative branch controlled the purse strings, the Court controlled neither. It must
1

See: Miranda, Lin-Manuel. “A Winter’s Ball.” Hamilton: The Musical.
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depend entirely on others to be effective. To Hamilton, this fact made the Court “...beyond
comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it can never attack with
success either of the other two [branches]; and that all possible care is requisite to enable to
defend itself against their attacks” (Hamilton, 1788).
Was Hamilton right? A lot has changed in the intervening 234 years, particularly with
constitutional divisions of power. From restricting state governments through the Bill of
Rights, to directly electing senators, the size and scope of the President’s cabinet (to say
nothing of the abolition of slavery, promotion of a multiracial republican democracy, and
expansive federal powers), the Constitution and government of today would arguably be
unrecognizable to the ratifying generation, including Hamilton. With the changes to the
structure of the Constitution came changes in the sources of power and authority for the
Court. Although Hamilton was correct in the inability of the judiciary to compel realizations
of its decisions through force, I would argue that Hamilton undervalued the usefulness of
popular legitimacy and its path dependency in his assertion that the Court would be the
least dangerous branch.
As we’ve seen, a goal of all governing institutions is to inculcate a sense of legitimacy
such that it need not resort to using the purse or sword to be effective (Weber, 1947; Easton,
1965; Tyler, 2006b). Although the Congress controls the power of the purse, it rarely uses
that power to coerce widely-unpopular outcomes. Similarly, the president rarely sends troops
to American cities to compel unpopular acts.2 For the Court, legitimacy is a useful, noncoercive tool and source of power to get its decisions realized. To put this a different way,
if a government or institution must rely on the purse and sword to maintain the regime, it
opens itself up to a world of hurt and risks “living on a precipice of disorder” (Easton, 1965,
279). While it is true that some of the legitimacy observed today is the result of decades of
the Court being placed on a pedestal by the elected branches (Whittington, 2007; Graber,
2

Of course, it has happened, but it’s not a weekly occurrence.
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1993), legitimacy nevertheless exists and is critical for the Court to realize its decisions.
Not only does legitimacy exist for the Court, but the other branches of government seem
set on protecting (and even enhancing) that legitimacy. In their final report, the Presidential
Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States uses the word “legitimacy” a total of
58 times across nearly 300 pages. Though the concept is invoked in a variety of contexts (and
never properly defined), the report underscores the importance of “protecting or enhancing
the Court’s legitimacy” (6) and uses this as a consideration when evaluating the current
state of, practices at, and proposed reforms to the Court. The fact that the report uses
various understandings of legitimacy and never actually provides a definition underscores
the challenges associated with measuring this amorphous concept.
Related, a press release announcing an investigation into the Court’s use of its “shadow
docket” by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted that the Court “must operate with
the highest regard for judicial integrity in order to earn the public’s trust.” The Committee
investigated the Court in part out of fear that its increasing reliance on the Shadow Docket
to deliver unpopular outcomes would affect how the public perceives the Court. The fact
that the other two branches of power seem determined to protect the legitimacy of the Court
and, consequently, protect an important source of its inherent power, seems to run counter
to Hamilton’s expectations.
The goal of this dissertation has been to evaluate the current state of legitimacy for the
Supreme Court in the 21st Century and to see how such reverence for the institution, should
it still exist, relates to efforts at reform. This concluding chapter recounts the puzzle that
we set out to investigate and also underscore some of the things we’ve learned along this
magical journey together.
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5.1

The “Puzzle”

For the first time in almost a century, serious conversations are taking place involving reform of the nation’s highest Court. These reform attempts are not just coming from one
political party or ideology: Democrats, Republicans, Liberals, and Conservatives have all
endorsed some form of Court reform in recent years, whether expansion, retraction, term
limits, mandatory retirement ages, or something else. Additionally, available public opinion data shows a public willing to support many of these reforms while, at the same time,
exhibiting record-low levels of confidence in the Court.3
Why does any of this matter? Well, although legitimacy is crucial for all governing
institutions, it is amorphous and impossible to measure directly. Instead, we can only infer
that legitimacy exists by looking at observable downstream consequences that (theoretically)
exist as a result of legitimacy. It is these indicators of legitimacy that help us infer whether an
institution is “healthy” (in a legitimacy sense) or in danger. For decades, researchers focusing
on the health of the Supreme Court have opted to measure institutional support—that is,
whether people are willing to defend the Supreme Court from reform—as their preferred
indicator for legitimacy. This choice relates to historical examples of when the Court’s
legitimacy was thought to be at its lowest (such as FDR’s Court Packing plan of 1937).
And, not only that, it makes intuitive sense: so long as people view the Court as legitimate,
they should oppose efforts at reform. As a result, our current political climate, where scores
of groups are calling for reform, signals a pretty significant decrease in legitimacy under the
widely-used indicator.
If the Court’s legitimacy has evaporated, then we can expect subsequent negative impacts
on the ability of the Court to do what we think courts ought to do: like, resolve disputes,
3
For example, both Quinnipiac (https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3820) and Gallup
(https://news.gallup.com/poll/354908/approval-supreme-court-down-new-low.aspx) polling shows SCOTUS
approval at all-time lows.
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protect minority rights, and “hold the countryside” (Shapiro, 1981; Ely, 1980; Zilis, 2021).
If the Court has lost its legitimacy, it would be unable to overcome the “countermajoritarian
difficulty” and, consequently, would stop being countermajoritarian (Bickel, 1986). Has the
Court as we know it come to an end? More specifically, what is the status of the Court’s
legitimacy in our political climate? This dissertation argues that the Court’s legitimacy is
alive and well. Not only that, but it is thriving.
To make this argument, I take from the starting point that legitimacy and institutional
support will not always be positively related, as existing scholarship has assumed. Instead,
it is theoretically possible that legitimacy might serve as a powerful tool to achieve policy
goals, and that this possibility can compel individuals to support reform of the Court. In
other words, the reason the Court is so powerful is precisely because of its legitimacy, and
groups can want to alter the institution either to prevent or to achieve policy objectives.
Importantly, doing so would not necessarily imperil the legitimacy of the institution.
But, how would we know? Or, to put this another way, what might a legitimacy-free
Supreme Court look like (Carrington and French, 2022)? One way that it might manifest is
through a willingness to support altering the Court as existing scholarship posits. However,
it is not clear that supporting reform is a sufficient (nor necessary) condition to warn that
the status of the Court as a co-equal branch of government is in jeopardy or that the Court’s
legitimacy has subsided. It is possible to support reform while nevertheless conferring it
enough legitimacy to maintain itself in the constitutional order. Its judgements can still be
enforced while institutional reform is taking place and its power remains.
Instead, this dissertation argues that a better indicator of legitimacy—one which is both a
necessary and sufficient condition to warn that the Court’s status is deteriorating—relates to
how obligated the public feels toward the Court. Not only is a widespread sense of obligation
relevant to the ability of the Court to get its judgements implemented (and do everything else
we think a Court should do), but it is also directly measurable. High levels of obligation felt
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toward the Court increases the social and political costs for ignoring the Court’s judgements,
offering an important (and underappreciated) avenue around Hamilton’s assertion that the
Court is the “least dangerous” branch. If the public feels obligated toward the Court, it
would be unwise for elected officials to simply shirk its judgements, even those which are
unpopular.

5.2

Findings

A few findings from this dissertation are worth emphaizing again in the conclusion. The first
regards the latent dimensions of legitimacy. The results presented in Chapter 2 suggests
that obligation felt toward the Court and a willingness to defend the Court are two distinct
dimensions. Moreover, the former is only partially incorporated into the latter, as was
demonstrated using both correlation matrices and a principal-component analysis. In the
PCA, the results suggest that the two batteries are orthogonally related. Importantly, with
the exception of the single question from the traditional battery loading into the obligation
battery, the two batteries seem to be negatively correlated: that is, as obligation felt increases,
willingness to defend the Court decreases.
Turning to the survey presented in Chapter 3, the results offer support for the theory
that institutional support is separate from felt obligation. Specifically, the linear models
presented demonstrate that some considerations correlate with institutional support (like a
belief that the Court is hostile to group interests or that it is broken) but not with the level of
obligation felt toward the Court. In Chapter 4, though, the story gets more complicated, as
two experiments (offering mixed findings) fail to substantiate the claim. While attempting to
manipulate institutional support but not felt obligation, one experiment returned null results
across the board while the other showed that both the traditional and proposed batteries
move together. Further experiments are needed to better dissect the causal direction of the
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observational results shown in Chapter 3.

5.3

Broader Contributions

The contributions this dissertation makes to the world can be divided into three components:
theoretical, empirical, and practical. This section discusses each in turn.
Theoretically, I challenge the conventional wisdom in the literature that legitimacy and
institutional support will always be positively related. Instead, the project advances the
theory that legitimacy can compel reform of the institution by serving as a sword to use for
policy goals rather than an anodyne evaluation of the institution.
One way to think of this theoretical contribution is by asking what legitimacy requires
of the governed. According to the widely-adopted account, judicial legitimacy requires us to
always be governed by the dead hand of the past because any efforts at changing the Court
(even that which is done with the goal of modernizing the institution or even enhancing
its legitimacy) is ipso facto indicative of a decrease in legitimacy. This theoretical account
seems not only incomplete, but also antidemocratic. While the Court acts as a normative
countermajoritarian check, it does not follow that the institution itself should be beyond
reproach through democratic channels.
Instead, I argue that legitimacy theoretically requires the Court to be able to function
effectively as a Court, meaning that everything we associate with a Court should remain
plausible. Legitimacy does not require unquestioning loyalty to the institution but, instead,
that we honor its judgements even if we might try to get those judgements reversed, overturned, or while we want to adjust the number of justices. As noted in an earlier chapter:
what matters for legitimacy is that a sizable portion of the public is willing to respond “how
high?” when the justices yell “JUMP!” even while the same members of the public wish to
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change whether Democratic or Republican justices are doing the yelling.
A high level of obligation felt toward the Court explains several observed phenomena, such
as groups turning to the Court for recognition of rights and privileges, parties attempting to
entrench themselves into the institution, and very high levels of compliance with the Court’s
judgements. As obligation felt toward the Court increases, so too do the costs associated
with ignoring the Court. Conversely, once the obligation felt begins to deteriorate, the Court
theoretically becomes much less effective at getting its decisions realized absent force.
Empirically, this project shows that the obligation felt toward the Court among the mass
public is quite high. Indeed, in all of the studies presented, the base level of obligation felt
toward the Court is higher than peoples’ willingness to defend the Court from changes. This
high sense of obligation felt toward the Court increases the political and social costs for
shirking the Court’s decisions, making it an effective mechanism for realizing the Court’s
decisions without it needing either the purse or sword (take that, Hamilton!).
Another empirical contribution is by helping bring the existing literature in line with
what we see in the world. Just the last several months have seen a Supreme Court willing to
increasingly use its emergency docket to decide the merits of controversial cases (like Texas’s
abortion ban or the COVID pandemic restrictions). Moreover, the Court has recently added
a whole host of high-profile “culture war” issues onto its docket, including LGBT rights,
affirmative action, gun control, and abortion, just to name a few.
We would not expect a Court that is on the verge of losing its legitimacy to behave in
this way. Knowing that justices are strategic actors who are keenly aware of their need to
maintain legitimacy as an important source of their power, it seems that a Court which
senses a decrease in its legitimacy would, at least temporarily, shy away from the hot-button
issues. Instead, the Court’s own actions suggests that it perceives its legitimacy to be high
enough to get controversial decisions implemented.
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This point turns to the practical contributions of the project. The results here suggests
that Court reform can take place without jeopardizing the Court’s place in the constitutional
order, so long as people remain obligated. The action of the Court, combined with the
empirical findings of the dissertation, show that the public does feel a widespread sense of
obligation to the Court which should permit it to maintain its normative status.

5.4

Project Shortcomings and Avenues for Future Research

There are many shortcomings to the data presented throughout the dissertation that make
them less than ideal. Here, I recount some of the shortcomings and plans for future research.
When it comes to the theory, additional work is needed to connect the idea of felt obligation to additional historical work on obligation felt toward institutions independent of the
holders of the institutions.4 Likewise, additional theorizing would benefit the analysis on the
relationships between variables (specifically, whether felt obligation is thought to be stable
or fluid), and where these attitudes form.
Emprically, none of the data presented here derive from a probability-based sample.
Although the observational data are weighted to national benchmarks, they are still not as
ideal as a probability-based sample would be. Consequently, a goal for the future is to secure
external funding to fund a nationally-representative, probability-based survey. For example,
a module on the CCES would yield important insights while being cost effective. Another
shortcoming is the inconsistent results across the experiments. In the future, pretesting
should be conducted to validate the experimental treatments before their inclusion in the
study. The experimental results are also limited by time constraints and should be replicated
4

One suggested source to incorporate is “The King’s Two Bodies” by Ernst Kantorowicz.
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in other contexts.
Second and related, existing research using institutional support shows that the way
individuals respond to new information about the Supreme Court is, in part, dictated by
preexisting levels of legitimacy afforded to the Court. In other words, those higher in preexisting legitimacy respond differently to information about the Court than those lower in
legitimacy. Aside from the interaction effects evaluated in Chapter 3, the data here do not
provide for a robust investigation of how this existing observation holds for felt obligation.
Future research should use a panel design to measure preexisting levels of legitimacy and,
at a later time, expose respondents to experimental treatments to investigate conditional
effects.
Another contribution to be made in future research is to evaluate the impact of race on
obligation felt toward the institution. In light of vast amounts of existing research documenting the reduced levels of institutional support among Black Americans when compared
to white Americans, it is important to understand how this relates to the obligation felt
toward the institution.
Finally, the dissertation did not go too in-depth into the origins and predictors of felt
obligation toward the Court. An important avenue for future scholarship is to investigate
from where these attitudes originate, as well as what factors predict obligation felt toward the
Court. For example, how much obligation felt toward the Court is the result of dispositions
like right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) or social dominance orientation (SDO)? Might the
questions simply be picking up deference to authority in general? How does obligation felt
toward the Court relate to deference to Congress or the presidency? These are but a few
critical questions that should be addressed in subsequent research seeking to validate this
measure.
Beyond the immediate dissertation, however, a multitude of possibilities exist for further
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contributing to the field of judicial legitimacy. Several of these possibilities were previously
impossible because of the way that the field conceptualized legitimacy.
First, if felt obligation and institutional support are distinct concepts as argued, to what
extent is the former influenced by policy disapproval. The impact of policy dissatisfaction on
institutional support is currently a hot topic in the field. It could be the case that institutional
support decreases in the face of unsatisfactory policy outputs but people, nevertheless, remain
feeling obligated to the Court.
Another area for future research to explore is how varying levels of obligation influence
the willingness of various movements to utilize the judiciary as an avenue to promote social
change. Likewise, what is the relationship between legitimacy and partisan entrenchment.
Both of these relationships are speculated to exist to varying degrees throughout this dissertation, but future studies could focus exclusively on these questions and offer an important
contribution in and ov themselves.
Finally, questions remain about what causes obligation felt toward the Court to deteriorate. As the results throughout this dissertation show, however, it should not be assumed
that factors shown to influence institutional support will, likewise, affect obligation felt. To
this end, research within procedural justice theory would suggest that the Court making a
series of decisions predictable on partisan grounds (signaling unfairness behind the scenes)
might begin to erode even the obligation felt toward the institution. A future goal of mine
is to see how this new understanding of legitimacy relates to procedural justice theory, especially since previous efforts to connect Supreme Court legitimacy to procedural justice
theory have found mixed support.
Much like the legitimacy of the Court itself, research focusing on how the public perceives
the institution is alive and well. This dissertation contributes a small but important piece
to the puzzle by focusing on what, exactly, we are measuring. In doing so, it challenges the
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foundations of existing research while opening avenues for a plethora of future studies and
expansions.
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Appendix A
Legitimacy Battery Design
This section presents the procedure and results of the cognitive interviewing that took place
in order to construct the compliance attitudes battery. What follows is motivated by Boeije
and Willis (2013) who outline the “cognitive interviewing reporting framework,” or CIRF.

A.1

Research Objectives

The purpose of the cognitive interviewing was to get a glimpse into the mind of respondents
who were answering survey questions in an effort to ensure the internal validity of questions
that would construct the compliance attitudes battery. Given the ubiquity of the existing
“institutional support” battery of questions measuring legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and
Spence, 2003), it is critical to ensure that respondents are understanding any new questions
in the appropriate manner.

A.2

Research Design

Under normal circumstances, cognitive interviewing is conducted in person, among a small
group of approximately 5 to 15 people, in a laboratory environment. However, because
this research is being conducted during the Coronavirus pandemic, and upon researching
emerging best practices, modifications from this prototypical cognitive interviewing were
undertaken for this study.
Perhaps the biggest change is that the cognitive interviewing took the form of online
probing (OP) in an online survey environment. Moving online has several advantages to its
face-to-face counterpart. First, the online environment reduces the chances of false positives
by reducing interviewer effects. Second, because “live probing” is not yet possible in an
online environment, researchers must anticipate all probes ahead of time and program them
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into the survey software. This process systematizes all interviews from individual to individual. In other words, all participants in the study are responding to the same set of questions,
which is not true in a face-to-face interview which encourages live-probing. Third, online
probing allows for a broader geographic reach than a face-to-face study. Finally, the resources
required for an online study are significantly less than for a face-to-face. While traditional
interviews can take an hour or longer, online studies conclude in 10-15 minutes, maximum.
This reduced time commitment also lessens the financial cost on researchers, since participant
labor is reduced. Importantly, research consistently demonstrates that online probing produces similar results to traditional face-to-face cognitive interviewing (Meitinger and Behr,
2016; Lenzner and Neuert, 2017).
The cognitive interviewing was testing eight potential multiple-choice questions for inclusion in an eventual legitimacy battery. Depending on the question, each was followed by three
to five “probes” inquiring about various aspects of the question. In designing these probes,
attention was paid to the four components of surveys: comprehension, retrieval, estimation,
and response (Boeije and Willis, 2013). Each multiple choice question and its corresponding
probes comprise a “set,” and respondents were exposed to two sets. Importantly, Neuert and
Lenzner (2019) find no relationship between response quality among a number of dimensions
and the number of probes presented to respondents. However, to keep the interview short,
respondents were only asked to answer two sets and a series of demographic questions.
The total questions, and their subsequent probes, are:
1. “Even if a majority of citizens disagree with its decisions, people should still comply
with decisions issued by the United States Supreme Court.”
(a) “Why did you give this answer? That is, could you please explain your answer
further?”
(b) “What comes to mind when you read the word ‘comply?”’
(c) “What type(s) of decisions come to mind when answering this question?”
(d) “In answering this question, what ‘people’ do you have in mind?”
(e) “Is there anything unsure about the answer that you provided?”
2. “Decisions by the United States Supreme Court should be considered final and authoritative.”
(a) “When reading this question, what does the phrase ‘final and authoritative’ mean
to you?”
(b) “In coming up with your answer to this question, what do you think about?”
(c) “Is there anything that makes you unsure about the answer that you provided?”
3. “If necessary, people have an obligation to pressure politicians to comply with decisions
by the United States Supreme Court.”
(a) “In answering this question, what does ‘obligation to pressure’ mean to you?”
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(b) “What comes to mind when you read the word ‘comply?”’
(c) “Who do you think “people” refers to?”
(d) “Is there anything that makes you unsure about the answer that you provided?”
4. “It is okay for politicians to ignore a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court if they believe
they are doing what is best for the country.”
(a) “What does the phrase ‘ignore a decision by the US Supreme Court’ mean to
you?”
(b) “Who or what do you think of when you read the term “politicians?”
(c) “What do you think ‘doing what is best for the country’ means?”
(d) “Is there anything that makes you unsure about the answer that you provided?”
5. “Sometimes, elected officials need to ignore decisions by the United States Supreme
Court, and that is okay.”
(a) “Who did you think of when you read ‘elected officials?”’
(b) “What does the phrase ‘ignore decisions by the United States Supreme Court’
mean?”
(c) “Is there anything that makes you unsure about the answer that you provided?”
6. “People should obey the Supreme Court even if it goes against what they think is
right.”
(a) “What does it mean to ‘obey the Supreme Court?”’
(b) “What comes to mind when you think of a Supreme Court opinion that goes
against what someone thinks is right?”
(c) “Is there anything that makes you unsure about the answer you provided?”
7. “Sometimes, the Supreme Court is wrong and, when this happens, it is okay to ignore
its decision.”
(a) “What does it mean when the Supreme Court is ‘wrong?”’
(b) “What comes to mind when you read ‘ignore?”’
(c) “To you, how often is ‘sometimes?”
(d) “Is there anything that makes you unsure about the answer that you provided?”
8. “Those who openly advocate for ignoring a Supreme Court decision are a threat to the
rule of law in our country.”
(a) “What comes to mind when you read ‘openly advocate for ignoring a Supreme
Court ruling?”’
(b) “What does the phrase ‘rule of law’ mean to you?”
(c) “Who do you think the statement is referring to when it says ‘people?”’
(d) “Is there anything that makes you unsure about the answer that you provided?”
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Appendix B
Fall 2020 Lucid Survey
The Fall 2020 Lucid Survey is discussed in Chapters 1, 2, and 3. More information is
presented on the survey here.

B.1

Descriptive Results

This section presents the descriptive statistics of the Fall 2020 Lucid Study and compares
the weighted and unweighted samples.

B.2

Regression Tables and Figures
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Characteristic
Age: 18-24
Age: 25-34
Age: 35-44
Age: 45-54
Age: 55-64
Age: 65+
Female
Male
White
Black
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian – Asian Indian
Asian – Chinese
Asian – Filipino
Asian – Japanese
Asian – Korean
Asian – Vietnamese
Aisan – Other
Pacific Islander – Native Hawaiian
Pacific Islander – Guamanian
Pacific Islander – Samoan
Pacific Islander – Other
Some Other Race
Less than HS
HS Graduate
Some College
Year Degree
4 Year Degree
Professional Degree
Doctorate

Weighted %
11.95
17.86
16.31
15.93
16.57
21.37
54.93
45.07
74.77
13.29
0.93
1.35
1.35
0.93
0.21
0.41
0.62
0.93
0
0
0
0
5.19
10.32
28.47
18.07
9.85
21.40
10.06
1.83

Unweighted %
21.85
24.22
18.71
13.70
11.86
9.66
50.10
49.90
65.62
18.32
1.38
1.51
1.72
0.84
0.71
0.67
0.96
1.43
0.29
0.08
0.08
0.21
6.16
1.35
17.60
20.29
9.81
27.98
17.60
5.38

Table B.1: Table presenting summary statistics of the Lucid Survey (Study 1) comparing
both weighted and unweighted percentages. Weighting was conducted using the ipfweight
command in Stata which uses an iterative proportional fitting (raking) method to construct
the survey wights.
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Table B.2: Predictors of Legitimacy (Fall 2020 Study)
(1)
(2)
Institutional Support Compliance Attitudes
Concern for Future
-0.178∗∗∗
-0.0506
(0.0378)
(0.0380)
Judicial Obsolescence

-0.263∗∗∗
(0.0437)

-0.00700
(0.0599)

Ideological Proximity

-0.0815∗∗
(0.0294)

-0.142∗∗∗
(0.0298)

Age

0.0688
(0.0366)

0.172∗∗∗
(0.0470)

Ideology (1=Conservative)

0.0386
(0.0275)

0.0417
(0.0270)

Education

-0.0135
(0.0347)

0.0986∗
(0.0412)

Democratic Values

0.204∗∗
(0.0647)

-0.0660
(0.102)

Black

-0.0226
(0.0166)

0.0258
(0.0310)

Knows Court

0.0405∗
(0.0173)

0.0787∗∗∗
(0.0231)

Republican

0.0312∗
(0.0153)

0.0174
(0.0184)

Constant

0.614∗∗∗
(0.0486)
817
0.503

0.604∗∗∗
(0.0714)
817
0.186

N
R2
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Correlates of Supreme Court Legitimacy
By Conceptualization
Concern for Future
Judicial Obsolescence
Ideological Proximity
Age
Conservativism
Education
Democratic Values
Black
Knows Court
Republican

Support
Obligation

Constant
-.5

0

.5

1

Source: Lucid Study, Sept. 2020. N=817.

Figure B.1: Unabridged figure showing the results of the OLS regression presented and
discussed in Chapter 2.
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Appendix C
Experiment Supplementary Materials
C.1

Experiment 1 Preregistration
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CONFIDENTIAL - FOR PEER-REVIEW ONLY
Dissertation - Signals Study (December 2021) (#82551)
Created: 12/09/2021 05:58 AM (PT)

This is an anonymized copy (without author names) of the pre-registration. It was created by the author(s) to use during peer-review.
A non-anonymized version (containing author names) should be made available by the authors when the work it supports is made public.

1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
It's complicated. We have already collected some data but explain in Question 8 why readers may consider this a valid pre-registration nevertheless.
2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
Hypothesis A: Increasing the perception that the U.S. Supreme Court is broken will result in a decrease in institutional support but will not impact felt
obligation toward the Court.
Hypothesis B: Increasing the belief that the Supreme Court will decide cases counter to respondents' own political party will result in a decrease in
institutional support but will not impact felt obligation toward the Court.
3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
The DV of interest is legitimacy measured as both institutional support and felt obligation. Institutional support is measured using both the traditional
battery of questions in the literature and an original battery of questions measuring support for court curbing measures. Felt obligation is captured using an
original battery of questions measuring how obligated respondents feel toward the Court and the various dimensions of that obligation.
Traditional institutional support battery: 1) "If the U.S. Supreme Court started making a lot of decisions that most people disagree with, it might be better
to do away with the Supreme Court altogether." 2) "The right of the Supreme Court to decide certain types of controversial issues should be reduced." 3)
"The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court favor some groups more than others." 4) "The U.S. Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics." 5) "The U.S.
Supreme Court should have the right to say what the Constitution means, even when the majority of the people disagree with the Court's decision."
Court curbing: 1) Do you support or oppose plans to add additional justices to the U.S. Supreme Court? 2) Do you support or oppose plans to term limit
Supreme Court justices to a single 18-year term? 3) Do you support or oppose plans to require justices to retire after they reach a certain age? 4) Do you
support or oppose plans to make Supreme Court justices elected by the people? 5) Do you support or oppose this plan to enable Congress to overturn
Supreme Court decisions? 6) Do you support or oppose this plan to require a unanimous Supreme Court when overturning a law passed by Congress?
Felt obligation: 1) "Even if a majority of citizens disagree with its decisions, people should still comply with decisions issued by the United States Supreme
Court." 2) "Decisions by the United States Supreme Court should be considered final and authoritative." 3) "If necessary, people have an obligation to
pressure politicians to comply with decisions by the United States Supreme Court." 4) "People should obey the Supreme Court even if it goes against what
they think is right." 5) "People who openly advocate for ignoring a Supreme Court ruling are a threat to the rule of law in our country."
Response options for the traditional and felt obligation batteries are a six-point Likert scales ranging from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree" with
midpoint removed. The response options for the Court curbing battery are six-point Likert scales ranging from "Strongly Support to "Strongly Oppose" with
midpoint removed.
The primary DVs for the study will be constructed using an additive index after rescaling variables to range from zero to one. However, a PCA factor analysis
will also be used to construct the dependent variables as a robustness test and the results included in an appendix.
4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
Upon consenting to participate in the study, respondents are asked their political party affiliation using the standard ANES two-question prompt.
Thereafter, respondents are randomized into one of three study waves: a control wave, a "concern" wave, and a "broken" wave.
Those randomized to the "concern" wave are blocked based on their political partisanship and exposed to a hypothetical news article. This article conveys
that a high-ranking co-partisan expressed concern about the Supreme Court's future decisions and that these decisions are likely to go against the
respondents' party goals. Pure independents (who do not lean) randomized to this wave of the study are removed. After being exposed to the treatment,
respondents progress to the dependent variables of interest. At the end of the study, those exposed to the "concern" wave are debriefed. Those
randomized to the "broken" treatment are exposed to a page containing three real-world news headlines expressing, in various ways, that the Supreme
Court is broken or in need of being fixed. All respondents randomized to this wave are exposed to the treatment (with no blocking). Finally, those
randomized to the control wave progress directly to the dependent variables without being exposed to any treatment.
The study includes manipulation check questions after each treatment (where appropriate) and the control condition is also asked the manipulation check

Version of AsPredicted Questions: 2.00

Available at https://aspredicted.org/GQH_LVM
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questions. These questions will be used to ensure successful randomization across the treatment groups.
5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
To recover the average treatment effects, each dependent variable index will be regressed on treatment indicator variables using a standard OLS model. No
control variables will be included in the model since the study is randomized. However, if the study balance table indicates that the randomization was
unsuccessful on demographic questions, control variables will be included in the models to control for the failed randomization. Each model will be run
twice: once with the dependent variable comprising the additive index and another time with the factored dependent variables. The null hypotheses will be
rejected using the traditional cutoff for significance of p<.05.
6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.
Respondents are automatically removed from the study if they fail a (pre-treatment) attention check question, do not consent to participate, ordo not
participate to having their answers scrutinized via an attention check. Further, respondents will be excluded if they deviate more than two standard
deviations of the mean duration to complete the study. Respondents will also be excluded if they are not in the United States, are under the age of 18, or if
they do not consent to the researchers using their data after being debriefed (for those assigned to the "concern" wave).
7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the
number will be determined.
The study will remain open until 700 valid responses are collected. This number was selected due to a lack of resources and also an estimate of the number
of respondents necessary in each treatment condition to allow adequate comparison.
8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)
Data collection was ongoing when this study was preregistered. However, the data already collected have not been downloaded from Qualtrics nor have
they been analyzed. In other words, this study is being preregistered while data collection is ongoing and while the researchers remain blind about what
the data might or might not show.
In addition, the study contains several questions to create a battery of questions on how knowledgeable respondents are about the Supreme Court.
Because of the strong correlation between Court-specific knowledge and legitimacy, this "knowledge" index will be included in the balance table to ensure
successful randomization on knowledge across groups.
Finally, exploratory analysis will be conducted by modeling the legitimacy batteries on the manipulation check questions instead of treatment assignment
indicators. This will allow a more precise measure of the effects of the mechanisms of interest on the dependent variable and alleviate any intent-to-treat
effects from those who did not receive the treatments.

Version of AsPredicted Questions: 2.00
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Figure C.1: Preregistration for Experiment 1
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C.2

Lucid Experiment—Broken Model Output

Table C.1: Model Outputs from Experiment 1: Broken Wave
(1)
(2)
(3)
Diffuse Support Court Curbing Felt Obligation
Treated
-0.00202
0.0137
0.0123
(0.0178)
(0.0199)
(0.0178)
Control
0.507∗∗∗
0.430∗∗∗
0.634∗∗∗
(0.0127)
(0.0141)
(0.0127)
N
495
495
495
R2
0.000
0.001
0.001
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

C.3

Lucid Experiment—Broken Model Output (Manipulation Check)
Table C.2: Model Outputs from Experiment 1: Broken Wave
(1)
(2)
(3)
Diffuse Support Court Curbing Felt Obligation
Perceived Brokenness
-0.392∗∗∗
-0.373∗∗∗
-0.256∗∗∗
(0.0245)
(0.0293)
(0.0280)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
Control
0.733
0.654
0.788∗∗∗
(0.0160)
(0.0191)
(0.0182)
N
494
494
494
2
R
0.342
0.247
0.145
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C.4

Lucid Experiment—Hostile Model Output
Table C.3: Model Outputs from Experiment 1: Hostile Wave (GOP)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Diffuse Support Court Curbing Felt Obligation
Treated
-0.0388
-0.00144
-0.0262
(0.0280)
(0.0351)
(0.0273)
Control
0.602∗∗∗
0.543∗∗∗
0.681∗∗∗
(0.0201)
(0.0250)
(0.0196)
N
179
177
179
R2
0.011
0.000
0.005
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C.5

Cloud Research Experiment—Model Output
Table C.4: Model Outputs from Experiment 2
(1)
(2)
(3)
Diffuse Support Court Curbing Felt Obligation
Treated
0.0457∗∗
0.0440∗
0.0472∗∗
(0.0177)
(0.0177)
(0.0180)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
Control
0.477
0.342
0.605∗∗∗
(0.0124)
(0.0124)
(0.0127)
N
673
673
673
2
R
0.010
0.009
0.010
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

C.6

Cloud Research Experiment—Het. Model
Table C.5: Model Outputs from Hetergeneous Effects Analysis
(1)
(2)
(3)
Diffuse Support Court Curbing Felt Obligation
Republican x Treated
0.0336
0.0843∗∗
0.0810∗
(0.0328)
(0.0294)
(0.0324)
∗∗
∗∗∗
Democrat x Control
-0.0854
-0.164
0.00737
(0.0308)
(0.0276)
(0.0304)
Democrat x Treated
0.00525
-0.0589
-0.0402
(0.0437)
(0.0391)
(0.0432)
Republican x Control
0.529∗∗∗
0.414∗∗∗
0.611∗∗∗
(0.0232)
(0.0207)
(0.0229)
N
474
474
474
R2
0.035
0.186
0.018
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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